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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The slow motion meltdown of the residential mortgage market 
over the last year has revealed the risks associated with the 
subprime sector of that market.1  Many believe that the largest 
sector of the mortgage market, the conforming mortgage market,2 
remains safe because it is supported by two government-chartered 
companies, the Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly 
known as AFannie Mae@) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (commonly known as AFreddie Mac@).3
Fannie Mae (Fannie) and Freddie Mac (Freddie), two of the 
largest companies in the United States measured by assets,
  This belief rests 
on the assumption that the federal government would assist these 
two companies if they were unable to make good on their debt 
obligations.  This assumption is well-founded.  This Article will 
argue, however, that this support has been purchased at a 
potentially enormous price by the American taxpayer and that it 
should be formally abandoned. 
4 are for-
profit, privately owned mortgage finance companies whose shares 
trade on the New York Stock Exchange.5
                                                                                                                  
 1 See James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Lenders Broaden Clampdown on Risky Mortgages, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2007, at A3 (AJittery home-mortgage lenders are cutting off credit or 
raising interest rates for a growing portion of Americans, extending well beyond the market for 
subprime loans for people with the weakest credit records.@); Greg Ip & Jon E. Hilsenrath, How 
Credit Got So Easy and Why It=s Tightening, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at A1 (AHome buyers 
with poor credit are having trouble borrowing.@).  Subprime loans are those made to borrowers 
with Alower incomes, less wealth, and riskier credit profiles than traditional, >prime= borrowers.@ 
 David Reiss, Subprime Standardization:  How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to 
Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 994 (2006). 
 2 See infra notes 54B58 and accompanying text. 
 3 See Gregory Zuckerman et al., Dow Tumbles 2.8% As Fallout Intensifies; Moves by 
Central Banks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A1 (ARattled by a constant stream of bad news, 
investors in recent days have been shunning nearly all mortgages except for those that can be 
sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored investors that guarantee 
payments on loans that >conform= to their standards.@). 
 4 See The Forbes 2000, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/18/06f2000_The-Forbes-2000 
_Assets.html (last visited July 28, 2008) (showing Fannie Mae ranked at thirty-seven and 
Freddie Mac ranked at two hundred). 
 5 See FAQ > A Private Company, http://www.fanniemae.com/faq/faq8.jhtml?p=FAQ 
(describing Fannie Mae as private company) (last visited July 28, 2008); Press Release, Freddie 
Mac, Freddie Mac Announces Voluntary Delisting From NYSE Arca (Dec. 14, 2006), available 
at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/investors/2006/20061214_nyse_arca. html 
(AFreddie Mac common stock will continue to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.@). 
  Congress created Freddie 
and Fannie to develop a liquid national market for residential 
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mortgages in order to encourage homeownership.6  Fannie and 
Freddie primarily engage in two activities.  First, they help mortgage 
originators package their mortgages into residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) by providing credit guarantees for those 
securities.  This helps maintain a stable and liquid market for 
RMBS.  Second, the two companies raise capital by issuing debt 
securities throughout the world=s financial markets and use those 
funds to purchase mortgages and related securities.  Fannie and 
Freddie have historically profited in this line of business because of 
the spread between their low cost of capital and the amount that 
they must pay for the mortgage investments they keep for their own 
portfolio.7  These two activities, and particularly the second one, 
have driven the rapid growth and high profitability of the two 
companies in recent years.8
In creating Fannie and Freddie, it appears at first glance that the 
federal government disavowed any guarantee of the two companies= 
obligations.  Indeed, by statute, securities issued by Fannie and 
Freddie must contain an explicit disclaimer that they are Anot 
guaranteed by the United States and do not constitute a debt or 
obligation of the United States.@
 
9  This disavowal of a guarantee has 
been affirmed by Treasury officials and a leading legal scholar.10
Despite this seemingly clear language, Wall Street believes that 
the federal government would bail Fannie and Freddie out if they 
were to become insolvent.  Because the financial markets perceive 
them to be low-risk borrowers, Fannie and Freddie can borrow 
money more cheaply than other private companies, which is the 
 
                                                                                                                  
 6 See infra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 7 See FAQ > Fannie Mae=s Business, http://www.fanniemae.com/faq/faq2.jhtml?p=FAQ 
(last visited July 28, 2008) (describing Fannie Mae=s business); Freddie Mac:  Our 
Business, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_business/ (last visited 
July 28, 2008) (describing Freddie Mac=s business). 
 8 See infra Part II.  On average, Athe combined size of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
has more than doubled every five years between 1968 and 2002.@  RONALD C. MOE & KEVIN R. 
KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE QUASI GOVERNMENT:  HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 11 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS 
Report for Congress Order Code RL30533, May 18, 2005). 
 9 12 U.S.C. ' 1455(h) (2006) (as to Freddie Mac obligations and mortgage-backed 
securities); id. ' 1719(b) (as to certain Fannie Mae obligations); id. ' 1719 (d), (e) (as to Fannie 
Mae mortgage-backed securities and Fannie Mae subordinated or convertible obligations).  
AObligations@ include debts.  See sources cited supra. 
 10 For discussion about the views of former Treasury Secretary John Snow and Professor 
Robert Scott Carnell, see infra Part III. 
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source of their competitive advantage.11  The reasonableness of Wall 
Street=s belief is not merely of theoretical interest.  If Fannie and 
Freddie were to become insolvent, the losses could easily dwarf the 
billions of dollars of losses that have already accrued to investors in 
the subprime mortgage market.  This is because Fannie and Freddie 
have $4.90 trillion in mortgage-related obligations,12 which is of the 
same magnitude as the $5.05 trillion of federal government debt held 
by the public13 and the $5.70 trillion that is outstanding in the entire 
U.S. corporate bond market.14  And, as important, it is the American 
taxpayer, and not sophisticated investors, who will absorb the losses 
that will be incurred if Fannie or Freddie become insolvent and are 
bailed out by the federal government.  On the other hand, if the 
federal government did not bail out Fannie or Freddie, it could lead 
to an international financial crisis that could be greater than those 
posed by the 1994 Mexican peso collapse, the 1997 East Asian Aflu@ 
and the 1998 Russian bond default, the last of which triggered the 
collapse of the large U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management.15
Undertaking the most comprehensive statutory analysis to date, 
this Article evaluates the contradictory, but deeply held, 
understandings of the federal government=s guarantee of Fannie and 
 
                                                                                                                  
 11 See infra Part III. 
 12 See FANNIE MAE, MONTHLY SUMMARY 1 (Nov. 2007), available at http://fanniemae.com/ 
ir/pdf/monthly/2007/113007.pdf (providing Fannie data as of Nov. 30, 2007); FREDDIE MAC, 
MONTHLY VOLUME SUMMARY:  NOVEMBER 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.freddie 
mac.com/investors/volsum/pdf/1107mvs.pdf (providing Freddie data as of Nov. 30, 2007).  These 
Fannie and Freddie figures include both RMBS guaranteed by the two companies and the 
mortgages and mortgage-related securities that they hold in their own portfolio.  Fannie and 
Freddie=s share of all outstanding mortgage debt stands at around forty percent.  See Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt 
Outstanding:  1990B2007, http://www.ofheo.gov/media/marketdata/ESRMDOutstandi 
ng19902007.xls (last visited July 28, 2008) (showing outstanding mortgage debt through 2007 
with figures updated through Mar. 6, 2008). 
 13 See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, Federal Debt Subject to Statutory Limitation, in 
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, DECEMBER 2007, at 25, 25 
(2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/2007/12/table1_40.htm 
(providing public debt data as of Sept. 30, 2007). 
 14 See Securities Issuance Rises to $5.06 Trillion Year-to-Date; Credit Market Conditions 
Reduce Third-Quarter Volume, in RES. Q. (Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass=n, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 
29, 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://www.sifma.org/research/rese arch-quarterly.shtml 
(providing corporate debt data as of Sept. 30, 2007). 
 15 See generally INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION (Stijn Claessens & Kristin J. 
Forbes eds., 2001) (describing spread of turmoil through international financial markets 
causing collapse of large U.S. hedge fund); see also infra notes 143B46 and accompanying text. 
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Freddie=s obligations.  The Article contends that investors in Fannie 
and Freddie securities would likely not have any legally enforceable 
claim of a guarantee against the federal government should Fannie 
and Freddie default.  Despite the absence of such a legally 
enforceable claim, this Article demonstrates that, as a practical 
matter, Fannie and Freddie are so deeply enmeshed in the 
regulatory regimes of other American financial institutions that the 
federal government has effectively signaled that it would support 
Fannie and Freddie if they were unable to make payments on their 
obligations.  The federal government would provide this support in 
order to avoid a financial contagion that could quickly spread 
throughout the global financial markets.  The federal government=s 
guarantee of Fannie and Freddie=s obligations is, thus, implied in the 
American financial system=s regulatory environment. 
This implied guarantee, in turn, presents enormous potential 
costs to American taxpayers.  In exchange for shouldering these 
potential costs, American homeowners are eligible for a modest 
reduction in their monthly mortgage payments, which is just a small 
portion of the value of the implied guarantee that the federal 
government has given to Fannie and Freddie.16
The once seemingly remote possibility of a bailout has become 
more likely as a result of the ongoing meltdown in the mortgage 
markets.  In addition, serious accounting scandals involving the 
misstatement of earnings have swept over the two companies, 
exposing the operational risk to which these companies are 
exposed.
  Ultimately, this 
presents a poor trade-off for American homeowners and taxpayers 
who would be called upon to support any bailout. 
17  Compounding these risks are the hedging strategies used 
by the two companies:  if the interest payments that they owe to 
their lenders become mismatched with the interest payments they 
receive from homeowners whose mortgages they own, the companies 
could become insolvent.18  It was an analogous mismatch between 
interest rates on long term mortgages and short term interest rates 
on savings deposits that caused the Savings & Loans collapse of 
the 1980s.19
                                                                                                                  
 16 See infra notes 132B33, 266 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra Part II.B. 
 18 See infra Part II.  
  If Fannie and Freddie were to find that they were 
 19 See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis:  Truth and 
Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 27 (2000) (discussing reasons for collapse), available 
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paying more to borrow from investors than they were receiving in 
income from their mortgage portfolio they too could become 
insolvent.  And if that were to happen, the costs of a bailout could 
easily dwarf the tens of billions of dollars that the government spent 
resolving the Savings & Loans crisis of the 1980s because Fannie 
and Freddie have trillions of dollars of obligations outstanding.20
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II first offers a brief history 
of Fannie and Freddie and their role in the creation and development 
of the secondary mortgage market.
 
21
Part III reviews the various understandings of the implied 
guarantee put forward by market players, the federal government, 
Fannie and Freddie themselves, and scholars who study Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).
  Part II then introduces the 
loose regulatory environment in which Fannie and Freddie operate 
and provides a history of the recent accounting scandals that have 
accentuated the risks that the implied guarantee poses to the federal 
government.  It closes with a review of the recent battles in Congress 
to impose a stricter regulatory framework on Fannie and Freddie, 
two entities known for their extraordinary lobbying might.  As of this 
writing, Fannie and Freddie=s critics have not been able to enact any 
legislation that would restrict their operations, which continues to 
expose the federal government to the contingent liability of the 
implied guarantee. 
22
                                                                                                                  
at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf. 
 20 See id. at 33 (providing figures for cost of Savings & Loans crisis); supra note 12 and 
accompanying text (regarding Fannie and Freddie obligations). 
 21 The market for mortgage-backed securities is known as the Asecondary mortgage 
market@ or Asecondary market@ for short. 
 22 The term AGSE@ refers to Aa federally chartered, privately owned, privately managed 
financial institution that has only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bond 
market investors perceive as implicitly backed by the federal government.@  Richard Scott 
Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. 
REV. 565, 570 (2005); see also 2 U.S.C. ' 622 (2006) (giving similar definition for purposes of 
Congressional Budget Act). 
  The understanding of the implied 
guarantee varies dramatically among these parties and changes over 
time in reaction to changes in the law and in the market.  This has 
created significant confusion regarding the meaning of the term 
Aimplied guarantee,@ which this Article hopes to resolve.  Having a 
clear understanding of the implied guarantee, in the realm of 
finance, is the equivalent of having a clear understanding of the New 
Orleans levee system before Hurricane Katrina; without it, we 
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cannot properly assess risks and make appropriate contingency plans 
to respond to likely catastrophic scenarios. 
Part III catalogues and explains the Byzantine web of regulatory 
privileges granted to Fannie and Freddie by their enabling statutes 
and other federal statutes and regulations.  This Part offers the most 
comprehensive analysis of these privileges that has been done to 
date.  Part IV then argues that these numerous regulatory privileges 
form the basis for the federal government=s implied guarantee of 
Fannie and Freddie=s obligations because they entangle the financial 
health of the two companies with that of so many other financial 
institutions.  Taken as a whole, Part IV provides a definitive analysis 
of the legal status of the implied guarantee. 
Part V proposes that Congress terminate the implied guarantee of 
Fannie and Freddie=s obligations in order to protect American 
taxpayers from the hundreds of billions of dollars of potential 
liability that the implied guarantee represents.  In particular, it 
proposes that Fannie and Freddie be privatized, along the model of 
the successful privatization of Sallie Mae (originally, the AStudent 
Loan Marketing Association@), a former GSE that is now a fully-
private corporation.  Finally, Part V compares Fannie and Freddie to 
the Second Bank of the United States and concludes that a focused 
federal government can rein in a privileged financial institution so 
long as it is prepared for a fight from the beneficiaries of those 
privileges. 
 
 II.  FANNIE AND FREDDIE CREATE THE MODERN SECONDARY 
 MORTGAGE MARKET 
 
Mortgages have always been bought and sold by investors, but 
until relatively recently, the secondary mortgage market has been an 
informal arrangement.23  The introduction of residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) in the 1970s changed that; once mortgages 
are converted into RMBS, they can be easily traded on the secondary 
market with comparatively few transaction costs.24
                                                                                                                  
 23 Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market:  A Model of Dueling Charters, 11 J. 
HOUSING RES. 233, 236 (2000). 
 24 See id. (AThe rise in the secondary market in the 1970s and (especially) 1980s came 
about largely because of standardization of pools of mortgages . . . .@). 
  In the simplest 
terms, this is how it works: 
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1. Borrowers get mortgages from lenders in the primary 
market;25
2. primary market lenders then sell these mortgages to 
secondary mortgage market firms and use the proceeds 
to originate more mortgages in the primary market;
 
26
3. the secondary mortgage market firms then sell 
securities backed by the mortgages that they purchased 
to investors and use the proceeds of the sale to purchase 




The most important factor in the development of the secondary 
mortgage market has been the creation of two GSEs by the federal 
government:  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 
 
28  These two companies 
were unlike nearly all other financial institutions in the 1970s in 
that their businesses were not geographically restricted and they 
could develop a truly national market for mortgages.29
Fannie Mae was created in the 1930s to provide a government-
owned secondary market for loans insured by the Federal Housing 
 
                                                                                                                  
 25 See Proposals for Reforming the Regulation of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) 
(statement of Michael F. Petrie, Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association) (AIn the primary 
market, retail consumers consult lenders and brokers to learn about the types of loans 
available, decide which type meets their needs, and apply for loans.  The lender counsels the 
consumer, takes and processes the loan application and obtains supporting information, such as 
a property appraisal and credit history.  If approved, the lender agrees to make a loan to the 
consumer, funds it, and closes the loan.  This process, from the consumer=s first interest in a 
loan through and including funding and closing the consumer=s loan, is called loan origination.  
Loan origination and its related activities are the work of the primary market.@).  
 26 See Our Role Within the Secondary Market-Freddie Mac, http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
corporate/company_profile/our_role_secmkt/index.html (last visited July 20, 2008) (showing 
how Freddie Mac enters secondary market). 
 27 See id. (AFreddie Mac uses the funds from sales of these securities sales to purchase more 
loans from primary lenders.@). 
 28 See Van Order, supra note 23, at 236 (discussing history of secondary mortgage market). 
 29 THOMAS H. STANTON, DEVISING AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISING THE 
PUBLIC BENEFITS AND PUBLIC COSTS OF GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 2B3 (1999), 
available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/FinancialSectorWeb.nsf/(attachment 
web)/september8,2000finalpaper/$FILE/september+8,+2000+final+paper.pdf (noting that 
Fannie and Freddie=s national charters allowed them to overcome market imperfections 
in 1970s and 1980s that resulted from legal restrictions on banks and thrifts that since have 
been lifted).  With the modernization of the financial system, the raison d=être of Fannie and 
Freddie disappeared, but they remained.  See CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 152B62 (1998) (reviewing loosening of restrictions on interstate banking in 
latter part of twentieth century). 
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Administration.30  In 1954, Fannie Mae was reorganized to allow 
private capital to replace federal funds.31  It operated by issuing its 
debt and purchasing mortgages that it held in its portfolio.32  The 
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 partitioned Fannie 
Mae into a privately-financed secondary market institution, today=s 
Fannie Mae, and a government agency called the Government 
National Mortgage Association, today=s Ginnie Mae.33
Freddie Mac was created by the Emergency Home Finance Act 
of 1970 (EHFA) to form a secondary market for Savings and Loan 
(S&L) mortgages.
 
34  Freddie Mac was initially owned by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System and its member thrifts; now it is a publicly-
traded company like Fannie Mae.35  When it was first created, 
Freddie Mac purchased mortgages from S&Ls, and Fannie Mae 
purchased mortgages from mortgage bankers; their purchasing 
practices have since converged.36
Fannie and Freddie, along with Ginnie Mae,
 
37
                                                                                                                  
 30 Van Order, supra note 23, at 236.  Fannie Mae was created pursuant to the National 
Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 246, which authorized the establishment of 
National Mortgage Associations.  THOMAS H. STANTON, A STATE OF RISK:  WILL GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES BE THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS? 202 (1991).  AIn 1938, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation established [Fannie Mae] as a subsidiary.@  Id.  Fannie 
Mae=s charter is codified at 12 U.S.C. '' 1716B1723d (2006).  Id. 
 31 Michael J. Lea, Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Perspective, 7 
HOUSING POL=Y DEBATE 147, 164 (1996). 
 32 Van Order, supra note 23, at 236. 
 33 See id. (A[GNMA] was created in 1968 to handle Fannie Mae=s policy-related tasks and to 
provide a secondary market for government-insured loans.  It is on the federal budget as part of 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
  GNMA was responsible for promoting the major innovation in secondary markets, the 
MBS. . . . GNMA deals only in federally insured mortgages, primarily those insured by the FHA 
and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which account for 10 to 15 percent of the 
market.@). 
 34 About Fannie Mae > Our Charter, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml 
?p=About+Fannie+Mae (last visited July 20, 2008). 
 35 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (converting Freddie Mac=s 
ownership structure).  The term Athrifts@ is a catchall that includes savings and loans, savings 
banks, and mutual savings banks.  See 12 U.S.C. ' 1841(i) (2006) (defining Athrift institution@ 
for purposes of Bank Holding Company Act of 1956). 
 36 Van Order, supra note 23, at 236.  While Fannie and Freddie started out with different 
missions, they grew to have the same one.  See id. at 236 (AFannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
now . . . quite similar . . . .@).  The fact that there are two such entities may be seen as a 
historical accident or as a way to ensure some competition in the conforming mortgage market. 
 have made the U.S. 
secondary residential mortgage market Athe envy of every other 
 37 See id. at 236 (describing Ginnie Mae=s role in secondary markets); see also PETER J. 
WALLISON & BERT ELY, NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK:  THE GROWTH OF FANNIE MAE AND 
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country.@38  While Fannie Mae had created a secondary market for 
government guaranteed and insured residential mortgage loans prior 
to 1970, the broad secondary market began in earnest with the 
passage of the EHFA, which created Freddie Mac and allowed both 
GSEs to purchase and securitize conventional mortgages as well as 
government-insured or guaranteed mortgages.39  In the late 1970s, 
RMBS securitization took off as traditional lenders could not keep up 
with the demand for home mortgages.40  Securitization is of such 
importance that it is no exaggeration to say that it is Athe most 
important and abiding@ financial innovation in recent history.41
Investment in RMBS exploded again after institutional investors 
entered the market; indeed, the RMBS market has increased by more 
than five hundred percent from 1984 through the early 2000s.
 
42  
Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, non-federal-related issuers, 
such as commercial banks and mortgage companies, began to issue 
RMBS.43  These Aprivate label@ RMBS are issued without a 
government or GSE guarantee that Ginnie, Fannie, or Freddie would 
give, and they are typically backed by subprime and/or jumbo 
loans.44
                                                                                                                  
FREDDIE MAC 7 (2000) (noting that because Ginnie Mae can obtain funds for Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) and Veterans Affairs (VA) loan purchases at lower rates than any of its 
competitors (including Fannie and Freddie), those competitors cannot compete for those 
products).  Ginnie Mae is not the subject of this Article because it is wholly-owned by the 
federal government, see supra note 33,  and does not present the same set of issues that Fannie 
and Freddie do. 
 38 Richard Roll, Benefits to Homeowners from Mortgage Portfolios Retained by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, 23 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 29, 29 (2003). 
 39 See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage:  The Emergency Home Finance 
Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 765, 793B97 (2005) (describing enactment of EHFA). 
 40 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization:  A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 1, 6 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996) (describing funding 
shortfall caused by strong desire for home ownership); see also Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of 
Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION, 
supra, at 31, 34 (providing firsthand account of early history of securitization). 
 41 Kendall, supra note 40, at 1. 
 42 KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES '' 1.3, 2.23 
(2005).   
 43 See Joseph Philip Forte, A Capital Markets Mortgage:  A Ratable Model for Main Street 
and Wall Street, 31 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 489, 491 (1996) (A[S]ome isolated Private Label 
MBS issuance occurred in the late 1970s . . . .@); see also Eric Bruskin et al., The Nonagency 
Mortgage Market:  Background and Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF NONAGENCY MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES 5, 8B9 (Frank J. Fabozzi et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (providing history of 
nonagency securitization from late 1970s through mid-1980s). 
 44 See LORE & COWAN, supra note 42, ' 2.23.  The term Ajumbo mortgages,@ analogous to 
jumbo loans, is defined infra at note 60. 
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Fannie and Freddie participate in the secondary market in two 
ways:  (1) By issuing and guaranteeing RMBS for a fee and (2) by 
issuing debt and purchasing, for their own portfolios, mortgages and 
RMBS with the proceeds.45  The two firms face a variety of risk in 
their lines of business.  In both lines, Fannie and Freddie absorb the 
risk that the borrower will default,46 although such risk historically 
has not been a great one.47  As to the mortgages that Fannie and 
Freddie keep for their own accounts, prepayment risk (the risk that a 
borrower will prepay a mortgage prior to the end of its term when 
interest rates have dropped) poses a greater threat to profitability.48  
Prepayment risk is linked to interest rate risk (the risk that the 
payments that the two companies owe on the short-term debt that 
funds their mortgage purchases become mismatched with the 
payments they receive from the mortgages with long-term interest 
rates that Fannie and Freddie keep for their own account) which 
poses the greatest threat to Fannie and Freddie=s financial health.49  
Finally, Fannie and Freddie are exposed to operational risk, Athe risk 
of loss due to inadequate or failed internal procedures and 
systems.@50  The accounting scandals that have overtaken the two 
companies in recent years have highlighted the seriousness of this 
operational risk.51
Fannie and Freddie, as the dominant purchasers of residential 
mortgages, have effectively standardized prime residential 
 
                                                                                                                  
 45 See About Fannie Mae:  The Industry, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/industry/ 
index.jhtml (last visited July 20, 2008) (explaining involvement in U.S. housing industry); 
Freddie Mac:  Our Business, supra note 7 (describing activity in secondary mortgage market). 
 46 Dwight M. Jaffee, Reining in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, REGULATION, Fall 2006, at 
22, 22.  The recent meltdown of the mortgage market may, however, bode more credit risk in 
the future.  See James R. Hagerty, Fannie, Freddie Are Said to Suffer in Subprime Mess, WALL 
ST. J., July 28, 2007, at A3 (finding that Fannie and Freddie have avoided large losses from 
defaults on subprime loans but Aare likely at least to be singed@ in future).  
 47 Anthony Pennington-Cross, Patterns of Default and Prepayment for Prime and Nonprime 
Mortgages 16 (OFHEO Working Paper 02-1, 2002) (finding monthly default rate of 0.029% for 
prime loans which make up bulk of Fannie and Freddie=s obligations). 
 48 See ERIC WEISS, LIMITING FANNIE MAE=S AND FREDDIE MAC=S PORTFOLIO SIZE 4 (Cong. 
Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS22307, Oct. 21, 2005) (APrepayment 
risk is potentially more serious [than credit risk].@). 
 49 See id. at 4B5 (AInterest rate risk can be very serious.  Many savings and loan 
associations became insolvent in the early 1980s because of it.@). 
 50 Id. at 5. 
 51 See id. (AFannie Mae=s current accounting problems, and those of Freddie Mac in 2003, 
raise questions about internal controls.@); see also infra Part II.B (describing recent accounting 
scandals). 
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mortgages by promulgating buying guidelines.52  Such 
standardization has led to increases in the liquidity and 
attractiveness of mortgages as investments to a broad array of 
investors.53
The GSEs= charters restrict the mortgages they may buy.
   
54  In 
general, they may only buy mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of 
eighty percent or less unless the mortgage carries mortgage 
insurance or other credit support55 and may not buy mortgages with 
principal amounts greater than an amount set each year.56  Loans 
that comply with the restrictions placed on Fannie and Freddie are 
known as Aconforming@ loans.57  Those that do not comply with either 
of these restrictions are known as Anonconforming@ loans, which may 
not be purchased by Fannie or Freddie.58
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now own or securitize roughly forty 




                                                                                                                  
 52 See STANTON, supra note 30, at 86 (ATogether, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
standardized the terms of mortgage loan documents and helped to standardize the procedures 
used by mortgage sellers and servicers, thereby facilitating the emergence of a highly efficient 
national secondary market for home mortgages.@).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also have 
increased the safety of RMBS investments by offering credit guaranties, Awhich involve[ ] 
guaranteeing the credit performance of single-family and multifamily loans for a fee.@  
Mortgage-Backed Securities:  Understanding Fannie Mae As a Securities Issuer, http://www. 
fanniemae.com/mbs/understanding/index.jhtml (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 53 See Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization:  History of Interaction of Economics, 
Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397, 400 (1972) (noting 
that Fannie Mae created task force to identify Asubstantive mortgage clauses which would be 
essential to make the [uniform form of] mortgage saleable to investors@). 
 54 S. Wayne Passmore et al., GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and the Long-Run Effects of Mortgage 
Securitization, 25 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 215, 217 (2002). 
 55 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1454(a)(2) (2006) (providing restrictions for Freddie Mac); id. ' 1717(b)(2) 
(providing restrictions for Fannie Mae). 
 56 See Press Release, Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, 2007 Conforming Loan Limit 
To Remain at $417,000, at 1 (Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/PR 
ConfLoan07.pdf (AThe conforming loan limit determines the maximum size of a mortgage that 
an Enterprise can buy or guarantee.@).  The 2007 conforming loan limit for a single-family home 
is $417,000.  Id. 
 57 See Glossary of Finance and Economic Terms, A-F - Freddie Mac, http://www.freddie 
mac.com/smm/a_f.htm (last visited July 22, 2008) (defining Aconforming mortgage@). 
 58 See Bruskin et al., supra note 43, at 6B7 (identifying major categories of nonconforming 
loans as jumbos and B/C quality, which includes subprime low-doc and no-doc loans); Passmore 
et al., supra note 54, at 218 (AMost private-sector securitizations are backed by jumbo 
mortgages or mortgages held by >sub-prime= borrowers, the bulk of which have blemished credit 
histories but adequate assets or income to support a mortgage.@). 
 59 See Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, supra note 12 (showing residential 
mortgage debt outstanding). 
  The remainder of the secondary market (other than the 
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portion originated by Ginnie Mae) comes from Aprivate label@ firmsCa 
large component of which is composed of jumbo and subprime 
mortgage securitizations.60  Private-label firms are not in a position 
to compete head on with GSEs as their cost of capital is greater.61  
Because of this advantage, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can price 
their securities more attractively than private label issuers, and 
therefore have nearly the entire prime, conforming market to 
themselvesCa market in which they can effectively act as 
duopolists.62
Fannie and Freddie are regulated in some regards by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, in some regards by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and in some 
regards by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO), which is an independent agency located within HUD.
 
 
A. FANNIE AND FREDDIE HAVE FUNCTIONED WITH LIMITED 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
 
63  In 
part because of this divided regulatory regime, it is generally agreed 
that Fannie and Freddie are insufficiently monitored as compared to 
other federally regulated financial institutions such as members of 
the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation.64
                                                                                                                  
 60 See Van Order, supra note 23, at 237 (describing breakdown of secondary mortgage 
market and use of Aprivate label@ secondary market).  According to the Federal Reserve, FHA 
and VA loans constitute about eleven percent of the total residential mortgage market; 
commentators believe that jumbos make up another fifteen.  WALLISON & ELY, supra note 37, 
at 7.  AThat leaves 74 percent of the total residential market in which Fannie and Freddie can 
invest.  Of that portion most are conventional/conforming loans; the balance are subprime, 
home equity, and multifamily housing loans.@  Id. at 7B8.  Those loans that comply with Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac requirements, except for the restriction on loan amount, typically are 
referred to as Ajumbo mortgages.@  Passmore et al., supra note 54, at 218. 
 61 WALLISON & ELY, supra note 37, at 1 (AThe lower interest rates that Fannie and Freddie 
can command because of their government backing permit them to out-compete any private-
sector rival and to dominate any market they are permitted to enter.@). 
 62 See STANDARD & POOR=S, PRICING AND PREPAYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF 
NONCONFORMING MORTGAGE POOLS 1 (2000).  The nonconforming rate usually is twenty-five to 
fifty basis points higher than the conforming rate.  Id. 
 63 See generally HUD=s Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/hsg/gse/gse.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (describing how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
are regulated). 
 
 64 See, e.g., LORETTA NOTT & BARBARA MILES, GSE REGULATORY REFORM:  FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS21724, 
Apr. 27, 2006) (AThere is a general consensus that the current regulatory regime is ill-equipped 
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Pursuant to their charters, Fannie and Freddie must receive the 
approval of the Treasury before issuing debt.65  While the Treasury 
does require that Fannie and Freddie abide by this provision, the 
Treasury has not been known to deny any of Fannie and Freddie=s 
requests.66
While current law appears to grant HUD broad regulatory 
oversight of Fannie and Freddie, its supervision is mostly limited to 
reviewing new programs that Fannie and Freddie want to initiate 
and ensuring that Fannie and Freddie comply with the affordable 
housing goals that have been set for them by statute.
 
67  Fannie and 
Freddie have not always acted consistent with this regulatory 
regime; Fannie and Freddie regulator, Assistant Secretary for 
Housing John Weicher, testified recently that he Asometimes learns 
about new GSE programs by reading about them in the newspaper,@ 
even though he has the responsibility to approve new programs.68
In 1992, Congress created OFHEO as an independent agency that 
was to be located within HUD, with responsibility for the Asafety and 
soundness@ regulation of Fannie and Freddie.
 
69
                                                                                                                  
to deal effectively with the housing GSEs.@). 
 65 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1455(j)(1) (2006) (regarding Freddie) (AAny notes, debentures, or 
substantially identical types of unsecured obligations of the Corporation evidencing money 
borrowed, whether general or subordinated, shall be issued upon the approval of the Secretary 
of the Treasury and shall have such maturities and bear such rate or rates of interest as may be 
determined by the Corporation with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.@); id. ' 
1719(b) (regarding Fannie) (A[T]he corporation is authorized to issue, upon the approval of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and have outstanding at any one time obligations having such 
maturities and bearing such rate or rates of interest as may be determined by the corporation 
with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury . . . .@). 
 66 See Randal K. Quarles, Under Sec=y for Domestic Fin., U.S. Dep=t of the Treasury, 
Address Before the Women in Housing and Finance (June 13, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4316.htm) (noting that Freddie and Fannie have obtained 
approval from Treasury for all debt issues). 
 67 See 12 U.S.C. ' 4541 (AExcept for the authority of the Director of the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight . . . , the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall 
have general regulatory power over each enterprise . . . .@); id. ' 4542 (granting authority for 
approval of new programs); id. '' 4561B4567 (providing affordable housing goals).  Prior to the 
enactment of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, id. 
'' 4501B4641, HUD had greater regulatory oversight of Fannie and Freddie; see HUD=s 
Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra note 63 (noting that Fannie and Freddie 
have been regulated by HUD since 1968 and 1989 respectively).  Freddie also had been 
regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the past.  W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. 
White, Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and Freddie:  How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?, 19 
J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 174 n.10 (2005) (describing timeline of responsibility over Freddie). 
 68 MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS=N, WHY THE BRIGHT LINE HELPS MORTGAGE MARKETS 6 (2005). 
 69 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3941 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. '' 4501B4641). 
  OFHEO has the 
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authority to regulate Fannie and Freddie in the following important 
ways:  establish capital standards; conduct financial examinations; 
determine capital levels; and appoint conservators, if necessary.70  
Scott Frame and Lawrence White interpret the federal government=s 
creation of OFHEO as an admission of its Aconcern about the likely 
political reality of the implied guarantee; paradoxically, this 
regulation may also strengthen the financial markets= belief in an 
implied guarantee.@71  Yet, according to leading critics of Fannie and 
Freddie, OFHEO Alacks many of the powers routinely provided the 
regulators of depository institutions.@72
Congress created OFHEO with significant structural 
weaknesses.  Specifically, the Federal Housing 
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act 
of 1992 . . . created a small, hyper-specialized 
agencyCwith uncertain funding and overly narrow 
powersCto regulate two huge, relatively homogeneous 
firms with great political clout.  The Act housed that 
agency in a department with no institutional 
commitment to safety and soundness, little credibility to 
spare, and little ability to protect OFHEO against 
pressure from Fannie and Freddie.
  Professor Carnell presents 
further detail about OFHEO=s shortcomings: 
 
73
                                                                                                                  
 70 12 U.S.C. ' 4513.  OFHEO does not have, however, Athe authority to alter these 
standards, which prevents the enforcement of greater capital requirements when there is an 
increase in perceived risk due to unsafe or unsound practices.@  NOTT & MILES, supra note 64, at 
5. 
 71 W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, 27 
REGULATION 56, 58 (2004). 
 72 PETER J. WALLISON, THOMAS H. STANTON & BERT ELY, PRIVATIZING FANNIE MAE, 
FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS:  WHY AND HOW 7 (2004). 
 73 Improving the Regulation of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 
(2004) [hereinafter Improving] (statement of Richard S. Carnell, Professor, Fordham University 
School of Law), available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/carnell.pdf. 
 
 
OFHEO=s structural weaknesses may have, in part, led to the 
accounting scandals that engulfed Fannie and Freddie in the last few 
years. 
 
B. FANNIE AND FREDDIE=S RECENT ACCOUNTING SCANDALS EXPOSE 
THE RISKS POSED BY THEIR OPERATIONS 
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Fannie and Freddie are well known for the political clout they 
wield on Capitol Hill.74  But the waves of scandals that surfaced and 
continue to surface have weakened them somewhat.  As a result, 
Congress has seriously considered bills that would increase the 
regulation of these two companies and limit their reach.75
The two companies= recent troubles can be traced to June 9, 2003, 
when Freddie Mac announced that it had fired its President and 
Chief Operating Officer David Glenn.
  None of 
these bills, however, sought to end the implied guarantee or the 
Fannie/Freddie duopoly in the prime, conforming market.  Thus, 
they are, at best, half-measures in terms of protecting the federal 
government from the massive contingent liabilities represented by 
the implied guarantee. 
76  These troubles revealed, to 
an extent not seen before, the level of operational and interest rate 
risk to which Fannie and Freddie=s massive mortgage portfolios were 
exposed.77  Freddie Mac fired Glenn because he had not cooperated 
fully with an internal review of the company=s accounting practices 
that was being conducted by OFHEO.78  Freddie=s Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer, Leland Brendsel, and its Chief Financial 
Officer, Vaughn Clarke, resigned soon thereafter.79  A short time 
later, Freddie Mac announced that it would have to restate its 
earnings for 2000B2002.80
                                                                                                                  
 74 See infra notes 106, 112 and accompanying text. 
 75 See N. ERIC WEISS, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC:  PROPOSALS TO REGULATE THEIR 
MORTGAGE PORTFOLIO SIZE IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 1B2 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for 
Congress Order Code RL34236, Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/ 
RL34236 (ACongressional . . . action to increase GSE portfolios is being considered . . . .@). 
 76 See Press Release, Freddie Mac, Termination Provisions Relating to David Glenn 1 (June 
11, 2003), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/glenn_comp.pdf (AMr. Glenn was 
terminated for cause on June 6, 2003 . . . .@). 
 77 For a discussion of operational and interest rate risk, see supra notes 48B51 and 
accompanying text.  Since 2003, Fannie and Freddie have increased their reliance on callable 
debt, which helps, to some extent, reduce their exposure to interest rate risk.  See Allison 
Bisbey Colter, Fannie, Freddie Are Expected to Shorten up Callable Debt, WALL ST. J., 
June 7, 2005, at C4 (explaining relationship between callable debt and interest rate swings for 
Fannie and Freddie). 
 78 Alex Berenson, Mortgage Concern in Broad Shake-Up, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at A1. 
 79 Jonathan D. Glater, Freddie Mac Board Forced to Remove Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2003, at C1. 
 80 Fannie Mae Chronology, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/ business/ 
investing/wire/sns-ap-fannie-mae-chronology,1,2072391.story?coll=sns-ap-investing-headlines. 
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Following this shake-up, investors began to question corporate 
governance at Fannie Mae.81  In response, Fannie Mae=s Chief 
Executive Officer, Franklin Raines, said that he believed his 
company had unfairly suffered Acollateral damage@ to its public 
image and business as a result of the improprieties at Freddie Mac, 
and further stated that A[u]nlike Freddie Mac, we didn=t do any of 
these things.@82
Except they did.  In October 2003, Fannie Mae revealed an 
accounting error of over $1 billion for the third quarter.
 
83  Though it 
was not clear that the error had been intentional, it caused further 
doubt about the company=s accounting practices.  Reports of Fannie 
Mae=s troubles continued to come out in dribs and drabs, keeping it 
in the news far more than Freddie.  On September 22, 2004, Fannie 
Mae confirmed that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
commenced an investigation into its bookkeeping.84  Fannie Mae 
acknowledged that the investigation was initiated due to OFHEO=s 
review of the company=s finances, which had uncovered serious 
accounting problems and earnings manipulation.85  In response, 
Fannie Mae=s board hired attorney, and former U.S. Senator, Warren 
Rudman, as an independent counsel.86
Just days later, on September 27, 2004, Fannie Mae agreed to 
boost its capital reserves by an estimated $4 to $5 billion and to take 
other actions such as tightening internal controls.
 
87  This was done in 
response to mounting concern about its stability, as well as pressure 
from OFHEO.88  Rounding out the turbulent month of September 
was an announcement by the Justice Department that it had begun a 
criminal investigation of accounting at Fannie Mae.89
                                                                                                                  
 81 See David S. Hilzenrath, Fannie Mae Defends Its Reputation:  CEO Decries Confusion 
with Freddie Mac Woes, WASH. POST, July 31, 2003, at E1 (discussing Ainvestors= uncertainty in 
the aftermath of the Freddie Mac accounting scandal@).  
 82 Id. 
 83 See Jonathan Glater, Fannie Mae Corrects Mistakes in Results, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2003, at C1 (AFannie Mae announced yesterday that it had corrected errors in its most 
recent financial results, which in some cases varied from the correct amounts by more than $1 
billion.@). 
 84 Jennifer Lee, S.E.C. Opens Investigation of Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at 
C1. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 James R. Hagerty & John D. McKinnon, Fannie Mae Board Agrees to Changes It Long 
Resisted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2004, at A1. 
 88 Id. 
  With Fannie 
 89 John R. Wilke, John D. McKinnon & James R. Hagerty, Fannie Criminal Probe Is 
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Mae on the defensive, CEO Franklin Raines and CFO Timothy 
Howard testified at a congressional hearing on October 6, 2004, in 
defense of the company=s business practices, explaining that the 
allegations against Fannie Mae were simply a reflection of different 
interpretations of complex rules.90  One month later, Fannie Mae 
failed to file its third-quarter financial results with the SEC.91  
Fannie Mae=s failure was the result of its independent auditor, 
KPMG, refusing to sign off on the report.92  In response, the company 
was forced to acknowledge that some of its accounting practices did 
not comply with standard accounting principles, and further noted 
that if the SEC decided it had improperly accounted for derivatives 
(the financial instruments used to hedge against interest rate 
swings) it would show a net loss of $9 billion.93
On December 15, 2004, the SEC affirmed OFHEO=s findings and 
ordered Fannie Mae to restate its earnings back to 2001 because it 
had violated accounting rules for derivatives and prepaid loans.
 
94  
OFHEO director Armando Falcon Jr. testified to Congress that the 
company had engaged in a Apervasive and willful misapplication of 
generally accepted accounting principles.@95  Less than one week 
later, both CEO Raines and CFO Howard were forced out by 
Fannie=s board.96
February 2005 brought news of further accounting problems as 
investigations into the company=s internal controls continued.  At the 
same time, rule changes and restructuring began.  Fannie Mae 
agreed, in accord with OFHEO findings, to new accounting policies, 
in addition to dividing Chairman and CEO into two separate jobs.
 
97
                                                                                                                  
Launched, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2004, at A2. 
 90 See Stephen Labaton, Chief Says Fannie Mae Did Nothing Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 7, 2004, at C1 (noting dispute over Acompany=s presentation that the accounting issues 
reflected judgments over ambiguous standards@). 
 91 Fannie Mae Misses Quarterly Report Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at C15.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  It should be noted that the underlying prime mortgage market was quite healthy in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.  See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS=N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY 
SURVEY, FOURTH QUARTER 2006, at 3 (2007) (showing foreclosure and delinquency rates). 
 94 Stephen Labaton, Fannie Mae Told to Revise Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1. 
 95 Floyd Norris, Bottom Line at Fannie Mae:  Looking Safe vs. Being Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 2004, at C4. 
 96 Stephen Labaton, Chief Is Ousted at Fannie Mae Under Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2004, at A1. 
 97 Fannie Mae Agrees to Changes to Prevent Faulty Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at 
C10. 
  
In March, Fannie Mae disclosed that it might have to record an 
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additional loss of $2.4 billion.98  When the Rudman Report was 
finally released on February 23, 2006, it both detailed the 
deficiencies in the company=s financial controls and identified former 
CFO Timothy Howard and former Controller Leanne Spencer as 
those with primary responsibility for the deficiencies.99  OFHEO=s 
report, released in May 2006, found that Fannie Mae had 
undertaken risky business practices, including interest rate risk that 
led to billions of dollars of losses, had engaged in accounting 
manipulation aimed at lining executives= pockets, had a pliant board 
of directors, and had portrayed a false image of company 
excellence.100  Following the report, Fannie Mae reached a settlement 
with OFHEO and the SEC to pay $400 million in fines, and limit the 
growth of its mortgage holdings.101
Freddie and Fannie=s scandals were actually quite distinct.  
Freddie restated its earnings because it was over-reserved.
 
102  Fannie 
restated its earnings because of unaccounted-for losses.103
Long-time critics of Fannie and Freddie seized upon these events 
as an opportunity to impose additional restrictions on the mortgage 
finance giants.
  
Nonetheless, while these accounting scandals did not reveal that 
Fannie and Freddie were ever near insolvency, they did demonstrate 
that the two GSEs were exposed to operational risk.  And operational 
risk, in another market, could have led to insolvency and financial 
contagion.  Congress was thus encouraged to reconsider the 
regulatory environment for the two companies. 
 
C. CONGRESS RESPONDS TO THE RISKS, BUT JUST BARELY 
 
104
                                                                                                                  
 98 Fannie Mae to Delay Filing Annual Report, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at C16. 
 99 See PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON, LLP, A REPORT TO THE SPECIAL 
REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FANNIE MAE 5 (2006),  available at http:// 
download.fanniemae.com/execsum.pdf (A[W]e conclude that Howard, the former CEO, and 
Leanne Spencer, the former Controller, were primarily responsible for adopting or 
implementing accounting practices that departed from GAAP . . . .@). 
 100 See Press Release, Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, OFHEO Report:  Fannie Mae 
Facade 4 (May 23, 2006), available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/fnmserelease.pdf 
(summarizing report=s findings). 
 101 Fannie Mae Chronology, supra note 80.  
 102 See Patrick Barta & John D. McKinnon, Freddie Mac Gets $125 Million Fine to Settle 
Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003 at A3 (discussing causes of accounting abuses at Freddie Mac). 
 103 See supra notes 93, 98 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 251B61 and accompanying text. 
  Despite the attention that has been paid to this 
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chorus of voices and the growing coalition arguing for GSE 
regulatory reform, at present Congress has yet to pass legislation to 
effect such changes, although it has considered a number of bills that 
do so.105  There are two possible explanations for Congress=s failure 
to act on this.  First, there are the formidable lobbying forces of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.106  Second, there is substantial debate 
as to both the appropriate breadth and details of GSE regulatory 
reform, which this Article addresses.107
In 2005, Congress considered an oversight bill that appeared to 
have some bipartisan support.
 
108
                                                                                                                  
 105 See, e.g., Clyde Mitchell, Government-Sponsored Enterprises B Are We There Yet?, 
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 2007, at 3 (reviewing recently proposed GSE legislation).  Congress has 
considered a proposal to temporarily raise the limit on the size of mortgages that Fannie and 
Freddie can purchase from certain high-cost areas like San Francisco and New York City.  See 
Sara Murray & Jonathan Karp, Will New Rules on Mortgages Help Borrowers?, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 7, 2008, at D1 (discussing proposal and potentially benefited geographic areas).  
Congressional insiders believe that this proposal, which is part of a broader economic stimulus 
package, is likely to become law.  See id. (A[C]ongressional insiders say [the Senate] is all but 
certain to accept the House provisions on Fannie and Freddie.@); see also Sarah Lueck, House 
Stimulus Bill Likely to Stand B Few Changes Are Expected to Survive Senate Debate, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 1, 2008, at A2 (discussing possibility of economic stimulus bill passing). 
 106 See Charles W. Calomiris, An Economist=s Case for GSE Reform, in SERVING TWO 
MASTERS, YET OUT OF CONTROL 85, 98 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2001) (AObservers of the current 
GSEs often note that they spend an enormous amount of resources, time, and effort lobbying 
the federal government to influence economic policy.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac=s senior 
executives often seem to be hired more for their political connections than for their knowledge of 
the mortgage market.@); JOHN J. KRIZ, MOODY=S INVESTORS SERV., GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED 
ENTERPRISES (GSES) 3 (2003), available at http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/ 
research/MDCdocs/20/2002400000428248.pdf (AThe potential for governmental support can be 
enhanced by the presence of powerful political constituencies that are interested in the GSE=s 
survival -- whether or not the GSE=s policy role is deemed to be >vital= to the overall national 
interest.@); Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests:  The 
Case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 468, 468B78 (2001) (providing 
history of intensive Fannie and Freddie lobbying of Congress prior to passage of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992).  Fannie and Freddie=s 
lobbying might have waxed and waned to some extent in response to various scandals and 
crises.  See, e.g., Eric Dash, Fannie Mae=s Offer to Help Ease Credit Squeeze Is Rejected, As 
Critics Complain of Opportunism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at C1 (noting Apolitical 
maneuvering@ of Fannie and Freddie and their critics in response to credit crisis). 
 107 See infra Part V. 
 108 See CANFIELD & ASSOCS., INC., THE GSE REPORT 5 (2007), available at http://www.gs 
ereport.com/2007/Jan%208-Jan%2022.pdf (discussing proposed GSE reform).  Increasing 
regulatory oversight is a perennial favorite, given that it is relatively easy to legislate.  See, e.g., 
W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Regulating Housing GSEs:  Thoughts on Institutional 
Structure and Authorities, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. R., Second Quarter 2004, at 87, 
89 (ADuring the summer of 2003, several members of Congress introduced bills aimed at 
strengthening the current supervisory and regulatory framework for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.@); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
  The bill would have slightly 
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increased the funding and supervisory power of Fannie and Freddie=s 
safety and soundness regulator, OFHEO.109  But the bill would have 
left OFHEO far weaker than necessary to supervise these two 
financial behemoths.  And of greatest importance, the bill did not 
address the fundamental problem with Fannie and FreddieCthe 
federal government=s implied guarantee of their enormous financial 
obligations.  In any event, the mounting credit squeeze that began in 
the summer of 2007 put GSE reform on hold.110
The accounting scandals revealed the extent to which GSEs could 
be exposed to operational and interest rate risk.
 
111  They also gave 
Fannie and Freddie=s critics in Congress and elsewhere the cover to 
push for various reforms.  But the extent to which the Fannie and 
Freddie duopoly has been able to fend off such reforms is a testament 
to their extraordinary influence in Washington.112  Indeed, a New 
York Times news article once described Fannie Mae as politically 
untouchable, with Aits army of high-powered lobbyists, its board and 
executive ranks stacked with Washington power brokers of all 
political stripes, a portfolio of $1 trillion and an apple pie core 
mission of helping people afford to buy housing . . . .@113
The debates concerning the appropriate safety and soundness 
regulation of Fannie and Freddie occur without much reference to 
the more fundamental question:  Should Fannie and Freddie be 
treated so differently from other federally regulated financial 
institutions?  This is in part because of the ambiguity that surrounds 
their special status, in particular, the ambiguity surrounding the 
implied guarantee of their obligations by the federal government.  
Until the scope of the implied guarantee is sufficiently defined, 
 
                                                                                                                  
 109 H.R. 1461, 109th Cong. (2005).  The bill also would have mandated that Fannie and 
Freddie place up to $500 million of their profits into an affordable housing fund.  Id.  This, no 
doubt, explains why the bill was so popular in the House.  At the same time that it would 
impose these modest burdens on Fannie and Freddie, the bill actually would increase the 
conforming loan limit in certain high cost markets like New York and CaliforniaCthereby 
allowing Fannie and Freddie to increase their market share.  Id.  This, no doubt, explains why 
the bill was acceptable to Fannie and Freddie. 
 110 See Stacy Kaper, Economy May Force Housing Legislation to Back Burner, AM. BANKER, 
Jan. 17, 2008, at 3 (AAs lawmakers rush to respond to the risk of a recession, they are pushing 
aside issues like mortgage bankruptcy reforms . . . .@). 
 111 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 112 See Damian Paletta, House Backs Fannie, Freddie Bill, but Obstacles Loom in Senate, 
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2007, at A12 (describing how Fannie and Freddie=s Congressional allies 
have worked to limit scope of safety and soundness regulation). 
 113 Jennifer Lee & Eric Dash, Long Insulated, Fannie Mae Feels Political Heat, N.Y. TIMES, 
OCT. 6, 2004, at C1. 
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Congress will not be able to properly assess how its safety and 
soundness should be regulated. 
 
 III.  DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT=S IMPLIED GUARANTEE OF 
 FANNIE=S AND FREDDIE=S OBLIGATIONS EXIST? 
 
As noted above, the mandatory language required on Fannie=s and 
Freddie=s securities, as specified in their charters, indicates that 
their Aobligations, together with the interest thereon, are not 
guaranteed by the United States and do not constitute a debt or 
obligation of the United States or of any agency or instrumentality 
thereof other than the corporation.@114  Notwithstanding the 
disclaimer language of Fannie=s and Freddie=s charters and 
securities, a consensus exists that there is a widespread perception of 
an implied guarantee of Fannie=s and Freddie=s obligations by the 
federal government, meaning that the federal government will assist 
them if they face financial difficulty.  As a result, investors are 
willing to pay a premium for Fannie=s and Freddie=s securities over 
that which they would pay for the debt securities of other private 
companies.115
Market players, the entities that buy and sell Fannie and Freddie 
securities, speak with one voice regarding the relationship between 
the federal government and Fannie and Freddie; the federal 
government does, indeed, extend an implied guarantee to Fannie=s 
and Freddie=s obligations.  Market players put their money where 
 
The depth, breadth and solidity of that perceived implied 
guarantee, however, is widely debated by market players, 
government officials, Fannie and Freddie themselves, and scholars.  
This Article argues that, while the federal government=s support may 
not be a legally enforceable obligation of the federal government, it is 
more solid than the mere perception of support; it is an actual 
Aimplied guarantee@ that has been written into the statutes and 
regulations governing Fannie, Freddie, and other financial 
institutions. 
                                                                                                                  
 114 See sources cited supra note 9. 
 115 Wayne Passmore, The GSE Implicit Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity, 33 
REAL EST. ECON. 465, 483 (2005) (AOne manifestation of the implicit subsidy is that investors 
view GSE assets as generally safer than most other financial assets, but GSE returns on equity 
are higherCcontrary to the common view that financial markets generally reward taking 
increased risk with higher financial returns.@). 
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their mouths are; they routinely purchase Fannie and Freddie 
obligations at prices just a bit higher than the prices they pay for 
Treasury securities.116  That is, market players perceive the risk of 
default of Fannie and Freddie obligations, notwithstanding the 
potential insolvency of either of those companies, as nearly as 
unlikely as the risk of a default by the U.S. Government itself.117  
The market comes to its conclusion by identifying a pattern amidst 
the strands of Aa complex web of relationships and market signals 
that, in toto, result in what may be deemed to be a de facto guarantee 
of the GSE=s obligations.@118
                                                                                                                  
 116 See Dwight M. Jaffee, Controlling the Interest Rate Risk of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
NETWORKS FIN. INST. 2006-PB-04, at 18 n.9 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=923568 (arguing that Fannie=s and Freddie=s ability to borrow at very Asmall spreads over 
Treasuries[ ] suggest[s] that investors normally ignore the possibility that the firms= strategy 
might have an adverse impact on their returns@).  Spreads for private-label mortgages with the 
same characteristics as conforming mortgages would be between twenty-two and sixty basis 
points higher.  See infra note 265 and accompanying text.  At the height of the 2007 credit 
squeeze, the jumbo-conforming spread spiked even higher.  See Murray & Karp, supra note 105 
(referencing one percentage point spread). 
 117 See Charles Kulp, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assessing the Banking 
Industry=s Exposure to an Implicit Government Guarantee of GSEs, Mar. 1, 2004, http://www. 
fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2004/030104fyi.html (A[L]ow yield spreads between GSE direct 
obligations and Treasury securities indicate that market participants perceive what is 
commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee.@). 
  These strands include explicit supports 
 118 KRIZ, supra note 106, at 2.  And, indeed, market players may distinguish the level of 
support that an implied guarantee may provide various GSE securities based on the 
characteristics of such securities.  See id. at 3 (AMoody=s may conclude that the implied support 
for some GSE obligations is greater than that for other obligations.  Such is the case with 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the USA, whose senior debt is rated Aaa, but whose 
subordinated debt and preferred stock are rated lower.@).  The two other major rating agencies, 
Standard & Poor=s and Fitch, offer similar analyses.  See STANDARD & POOR=S, CRITERIA 
UPDATE:  JOINT SUPPORT CRITERIA REFINED 5 (2006), available at http://www2.stan 
dardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/rfc_020306.pdf (discussing rating approach for GSEs); Fitch 
Ratings Definitions, http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/fitchResources.cfm?detail=1 (last 
visited July 28, 2008) (describing rating methodologies); see also Edward L. Toy, A Credit 
Intensive Approach to Analyzing Whole Loan CMOs, in THE HANDBOOK OF NONAGENCY 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, supra note 43, at 219, 219 (AFannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
supported securities are also treated by many as having the equivalent of U.S. government 
backing.@); Lawrence J. White, On Truly Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:  Why It=s 
Important and How to Do It, HOUSING FIN. INT=L, Dec. 2005, at 13, 14 n.5 (AOne important 
reflection -- and reinforcement -- of that halo is the way that financial information (eg, current 
prices and yields) about the two companies= debt obligations are listed in financial publications. 
 The Wall Street Journal, for example, lists this information in a special box that is labeled 
>Government Agency & Special Issues= and that is often located next to its listings of Treasury 
debt obligations (and unusually on a different page from its listings of corporate debt 
obligations).@); Robert A. Eisenbeis, W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall, An Analysis of the 
Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an Evaluation of the Policy Options 
for Reducing Those Risks 5B6 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2006-2, 2006) 
(ATaken together, the features of Fannie Mae=s and Freddie Mac=s federal charters have served 
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as well as implicit ones.119
While acknowledging that the markets act as if Fannie and 
Freddie benefit from an implied guarantee, the federal government 
has been very careful not to accept that conclusion as its own.
  This view, while strongly held, is not 
clear enough to determine whether market players believe that the 
implied guarantee is a legal obligation of the federal government or 
whether they merely believe that the federal government, for all 
practical purposes, has agreed to assist the companies 
notwithstanding its statutory disclaimer of any guarantee. 
120  
Instead, representatives of the Treasury and various federal agencies 
recently have been denying the existence of any such guarantee in no 
uncertain terms.  For instance, then-Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Financial Institutions Emil Henry stated that Athe 
Treasury Department and other government officials have made it 
abundantly clear that the federal government does NOT guarantee 
the housing GSE debt,@121 and then-Treasury Secretary John Snow 
has disavowed government backing for GSEs, referring to the 
Amarket misperception of an implied guarantee.@122
                                                                                                                  
to create a perception in financial markets that the federal government >implicitly guarantees= 
the companies= financial obligations.  This belief, in turn, allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
to issue debt at interest rates that are far more favorable (better than AAA) than their stand-
alone financial rating (around AA-) would justify.@ (citation omitted)). 
 119 See KRIZ, supra note 106, at 2B3 (discussing explicit and implicit support). 
 120 See, e.g., Proposals for Improving the Regulation of the Housing Government Sponsored 
Enterprises:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th 
Cong. 375 (2005) [hereinafter Proposals] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (noting that A[m]any counterparties in GSE 
transactions, when assessing their risk, clearly rely instead on the GSEs= perceived special 
relationship to the Government@); U.S. DEP=T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF 
THE TREASURY ON GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, at A-14 (1990) (noting that GSEs 
benefit Afrom perceived links to the Federal Government that support the capital market=s 
perception that its debt and MBS have an implied Federal guarantee@ (emphasis added)). 
 121 Emil W. Henry Jr., Assistant Sec=y for Fin. Insts., U.S. Dep=t of the Treasury, Address 
Before the Real Estate Roundtable (June 15, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.treas. 
gov/press/releases/js4322.htm); see also Kulp, supra note 117 (stating that benefits Fannie and 
Freddie receive Ado not extend to a guarantee of GSE issues@).  But see Frame & White, supra 
note 67, at 180B81 (AOne useful step would be for government officials to state clearly, whenever 
the subject comes up, that the federal government does not guarantee the debt of Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac and will not bail them (or their creditors) out.  No presidential administration has 
explicitly made such a statement.  More typical are carefully crafted comments that reiterate 
that the federal government is not required to bail out Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but fall 
short of flatly stating that the government will not do so . . . .@). 
 122 Proposals, supra note 120, at 74 (statement of John W. Snow, Secretary, U.S. 
Department of the Treasury). 
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Fannie and Freddie appear to argue both ways, depending on 
their audience.  Professor Carnell summarizes their position as 
follows: 
 
In managing their relationship to the federal 
government, the GSEs play an extraordinarily successful 
double game.  They emphatically deny that they have 
any formal, legally enforceable government backing, 
leaving the impression that they have no government 
backing at all.  At the same time, they work to reinforce 
the market perception of implicit government backing.  
In effect, the GSEs tell Congress and the news media, 
ADon=t worry, the government is not on the hook@ -- and 
then turn around and tell Wall Street, ADon=t worry, the 
government really is on the hook.@123
We have seen that market players speak with one voice, the 
federal government speaks with an opposing one, and Fannie and 
Freddie speak from both sides of their mouths on the topic of the 
implied guarantee.  The scholarly community has split into two 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
 123 Improving, supra note 73, at iii (statement of Richard S. Carnell, Professor, Fordham 
University School of Law).  Carnell has catalogued a number of extraordinary statements that 
Fannie and Freddie have made, given their frequent disavowal of the implied guarantee: 
[T]he GSEs work to reinforce the perception of implicit government backing. 
 Consider three examples involving Fannie.  In the first example, Fannie 
sought legislative history stating that Fannie and Freddie Aare implicitly 
backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government.@  In the second 
example, Fannie attacked Treasury Under Secretary Gensler as 
Airresponsible@ and Aunprofessional@ when he testified before a House 
subcommittee on March 22, 2000, that Athe government does not guarantee 
[GSEs=] securities.@ 
In the third example, Fannie argued in a 1998 letter to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency that Aall GSE issued securities merit@ more 
favorable treatment under the federal banking agencies= risk-based capital 
standards than all AAAA-rated [non-GSE] asset-backed securities.@  Thus 
the mere fact that a GSE issues a security makes that security more 
creditworthy than any non-GSE security.  An IOU issued by a financially 
troubled GSE (such as the Farm Credit System before its 1987 bailout) 
would, under Fannie=s reasoning, still be more creditworthy than a top-tier 
asset-backed security guaranteed by the nation=s healthiest fully private 
corporation.  Fannie based this argument squarely on what it calls Athe 
implied government backing of Fannie Mae . . . .@ 
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). 
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camps, one aligned with the market and the other with the federal 
government. 
The leading proponents of the market view of the implied 
guarantee include policy scholars Bert Ely, Thomas Stanton, and 
Peter Wallison.124  Professor Carnell (himself a former Assistant 
Treasury Secretary for Financial Institutions) is perhaps the leading 
proponent of the government view.125  The market-oriented group 
relies upon the market=s wisdom in pricing Fannie and Freddie debt 
obligations and argues that the charter benefits and other regulatory 
privileges form the basis of the market pricing.126  The government-
aligned group primarily relies upon the explicit denial of federal 
support in Fannie and Freddie=s charters, but allows that market 
players have mistakenly relied upon the web of privileges that the 
federal government has granted to Fannie and Freddie.127
                                                                                                                  
 124 See, e.g., STANTON, supra note 30, at 204 (AThe implicit federal guarantee arises from 
laws that give enterprise obligations and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) many of the 
investment attributes of federal government securities.  This is known as giving federal agency 
status to enterprise securities.  Many elements of the implicit federal guaranteeCsuch as the 
line of credit from the enterprise to the Treasury, the exemption of enterprise obligations and 
MBSs from SEC registration requirements, the eligibility of enterprise obligations and MBSs as 
lawful investments for federal fiduciary trust and public fundsCare found in the enterprise 
charter acts.@); WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 2 (describing financial risk to 
taxpayers created by government=s implicit backing of GSEs); Passmore, supra note 115, at 
465B66 (AThe markets= impression that the government implicitly backs Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac is based on the GSEs= history, on the size of their portfolios, on the fact that the 
government mandates housing goals for these firms and on the many indicia of explicit 
government support. . . . The result is an ambiguous relationship between the GSEs and the 
federal government in which investors infer government support while government officials 
deny it.@). 
 125 See, e.g., Improving, supra note 73, at 12 (statement of Richard S. Carnell, Professor, 
Fordham University School of Law) (AMarket participants had long believed such [implied] 
backing to exist under the GSEs= charters.  Congress did not act to correct that perception.@); 
Carnell, supra note 22, at 584 (noting that federal government has no legally enforceable 
liability for GSEs securities). 
 126 See, e.g., STANTON, supra note 30, at 157 (arguing that investors rely more on implicit 
governmental backing than on creditworthiness or quality of loans, which creates temptation to 
take Aexcessive risk[s]@).  These policy scholars tend to assume the existence of the implied 
guarantee without evaluating its basis in the law and regulatory environment of the two 
companies.  WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 2 (AIt is no longer a source of serious 
debate that the federal government bears some direct risk associated with its chartering and 
sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.@). 
 127 See Frame & White, supra note 67, at 159B62 (AFannie Mae=s and Freddie Mac=s special 
federal charters and the attendant package of special benefits directly lower their operating 
costs and have created a >halo= of implied federal government support for the two companies.@); 
see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 
2008] FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 1047 
 
Because this Article categorically disagrees with Professor 
Carnell=s interpretation of the implied guarantee and because his is 
the leading view amongst the few legal scholars who have closely 
studied this issue, it is worth quoting him at length: 
 
AImplicit government guarantee@ suggests that the 
government has already guaranteed GSEs= obligations, 
albeit without formally expressing that guarantee. . . . 
AImplicit guarantee@ refers not to what the government 
has done but to investors= belief about what the 
government would do if a GSE failedCa belief manifest 
in investors= willingness to lend to GSEs on exceptionally 
favorable terms.  Using Agovernment guarantee@ to 
describe investors= behavior has the potential to bias 
debates about GSE policy by insinuating that the 
government has a moral obligation to honor the supposed 
guarantee.128
Professor Carnell Arefers to investors= >perception of implicit backing= 





The stakes of this debate are obviously very high.  Eliminating the 
implied guarantee or even the appearance of the implied guarantee 
Acould affect the liquidity of some [FDIC] insured institutions by 
reducing securities values and pressure capital adequacy@ through 
higher risk-based capital charges for Fannie and Freddie 
securities.
  This is an important distinction because 
it reveals that Carnell does not believe that the market view is 
reality based.  This Article argues that it is. 
130  Indeed, even changes to individual strands of the 
statutory and regulatory web that makes up the implied guarantee 
may trigger big changes in the regulatory environment of many 
financial institutions.131
                                                                                                                  
 128 Carnell, supra note 22, at 584 n.113. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Kulp, supra note 117.  That is, if the implied guarantee were no longer present, FDIC 
insured institutions might not be able to treat Fannie and Freddie securities as ultra-safe 
investments for the purposes of their capital requirements.  They then would need to increase 
their capital requirements either by replacing such securities with safer ones or by increasing 
the overall amount of capital that they hold.  This would reduce their ability to leverage their 
capital, thereby by reducing overall liquidity. 
 131 The Congressional Budget Office has noted that: 
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Wayne Passmore, a researcher at the Federal Reserve, has 
estimated that the present value of the federal government=s subsidy 
of Fannie and Freddie is nearly $150 billion.132  One of the largest 
elements of this subsidy is the implied guarantee, the size of which is 
Aonly weakly controlled by policy makers because the GSEs control 
their own debt issuance and hence the size of the implicit subsidy.@133
Although Fannie and Freddie claim that they pass the subsidy 
along to homeowners in the form of lower interest rates, numerous 
studies have demonstrated that Fannie and Freddie keep a large 
portion of the subsidy for the benefit of their shareholders and 
management.
 
134  GSE shareholders appear to retain about half of the 
federal subsidy, in the form of increased profits.135
Of course, from the perspective of the individual homeowner, this 
is still better than the alternative:  borrowing at the unsubsidized 
and higher rates offered by fully private lenders.  The GSEs= 
uniformly better mortgage terms compound the benefit to the 
 
                                                                                                                  
Some observers have suggested that enactment of [a bill that would repeal 
Fannie Mae=s and Freddie Mac=s exemptions from the SEC=s registration 
and disclosure requirements] would reduce the strength of the implied 
federal guarantee.  If so, one effect could be to raise rates on the GSEs= 
securities.  However, other analysts disagree.  They note that the legislation 
leaves intact the GSEs= other privileges.  In addition, investors= perceptions 
may be influenced by the size of the enterprises in the capital and housing 
markets as well as by provisions of law.  If so, investors could conclude that 
the implicit guarantee would be unaffected by that statutory change. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF REPEALING FANNIE MAE=S AND FREDDIE MAC=S SEC 
EXEMPTIONS 23 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4199/05-06-03-GSEs. 
pdf. 
 132 Passmore, supra note 115, at 477.  But see Vern McKinley, The Mounting Case for 
Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 293 POL=Y ANALYSIS (1997), http://www.cato.org/pu 
bs/pas/pa-293.html (noting that AFannie Mae contends that it >is impossible to accurately 
measure the value of a subsidy that does not explicitly exist= @).  Passmore calculates that the 
value of the implied guarantee makes up nearly ninety percent of the federal government=s 
subsidy of the two companies.  See Passmore, supra note 115, at 466 (AMy calculation also 
suggests that roughly 44B89% of the GSEs= market value is due to their implicit government 
subsidy.@). 
 133 Passmore, supra note 115, at 484. 
 134 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that Fannie and Freddie kept up to as 
much as forty percent of the spread and passed the remainder on to borrowers.  See CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSES 27 (2001) (estimating Fannie 
and Freddie retain sixteen basis points of subsidy out of total forty-one).  The spread is the 
difference between the interest paid on one security, such as a private-label RMBS, and 
another, such as a Fannie or Freddie RMBS.  Id. 
 135 See id. at 1 (AThe ultimate beneficiaries of that subsidy include . . . the 
shareholders . . . .@). 
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individual borrower.136
While the contemporary valuation of the implied guarantee is 
enormous, the market=s understanding of it Aemerged gradually@ as 
GSEs sold their securities to investors who Ainferred a moral 
obligation@ under which the federal government would back their 
obligations in case of default.
  It is only at the macro levelCnetting out the 
benefits to all individual homeowners with the costs to all individual 
taxpayersCthat the cost of the implied guarantee becomes clear. 
137  There is an eminently practical 
reason that the federal government would now guarantee Fannie 
and Freddie obligations:  there are trillions of dollars of Fannie and 
Freddie obligations outstanding and Fannie and Freddie=s failure 
could trigger a systemic shock to the international financial system, 
much as the Long-Term Capital Management crisis did.138
The term AToo Big to Fail@ refers to a policy where a government 
chooses to intervene in the market and bail out insolvent institutions 
instead of letting them unwind their affairs through normal 
channels, such as the bankruptcy courts.
  In other 
words, Fannie and Freddie, like Long-Term Capital Management 
before them, are AToo Big to Fail.@ 
139  Governments usually 
take the Too Big to Fail approach with financial institutions that 
have significant ties with other financial institutions that would be 
materially harmed by the failure of the insolvent institution.140  
Thus, the stated rationale for the intervention is to avoid disruptions 
in various equity, debt, and currency markets.141  The FDIC has 
already sought to deflate Too Big to Fail expectations for the banks 
that it regulates.142
                                                                                                                  
 136 See Reiss, supra note 1, at 1011B12 (discussing better market position of Fannie and 
Freddie compared to private-label firms). 
 137 STANTON, supra note 30, at 26. 
 138 See supra notes 12B15 and accompanying text. 
 139 See Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are AToo Big to Fail@:  
Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1011 (1993) (defining AToo Big to 
Fail@). 
 140 See id. at 1011B12 (showing institutions Congress has chosen to bail out); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 7-10, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008326) (discussing systemic risk in context of financial institutions). 
 141 See Lavargna, supra note 139, at 1012 (AThe failure of a large financial institution poses 
systemic risks to the economy because it would disrupt the markets for federal funds, 
government securities, mortgage-backed securities, and even foreign exchange.@). 
 
 142 See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 36B37 (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing Congress=s curtailment of Too Big to Fail expectations).  See generally George G. 
Kaufman, Too Big To Fail in U.S. Banking:  Quo Vadis?, in TOO BIG TO FAIL:  POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 153 (Benton E. Gup ed. 2004) (discussing history of Too 
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There is a body of Too Big to Fail literature devoted to Fannie and 
Freddie in particular.143  This literature differs from the general Too 
Big to Fail literature because Fannie and Freddie present systemic 
risks144 that result from the fact that many financial institutions hold 
particularly large portions of their portfolios in the two companies= 
obligations because of federal regulations that encourage such 
holdings.145
                                                                                                                  
Big to Fail concept). 
 143 See, e.g., Benton E. Gup, Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Too Big to Fail?, in TOO BIG 
TO FAIL:  POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS, supra note 142, at 287, 307 
(arguing that Treasury and Federal Reserve ought to make joint policy statement that Freddie 
and Fannie are not too big to fail and provide strategy for dealing with risk of their failure); 
Lavargna, supra note 139, at 1038 (AThe enterprises are clearly >too big to fail,= as liquidating 
an enterprise would significantly disrupt the nation=s economy.@); Jaffee, supra note 116, at 20 
(AA key implication of the immense size of F&F is that it makes more understandable why 
investors in F&F debt and MBS are so confident that the implicit guarantee will be honored; 
the firms are truly too big to be allowed to fail.@); Sebastian Mallaby, Response to Richard 
Christopher-Whalen, in Risk-Return Profile, FOREIGN AFF., MayBJune 2007, at 163, 164 (AA 
financial system is most vulnerable when it is dominated by a small number of large 
institutions.  If one megabank blows up, there will be mountains of unpaid debt to other banks; 
this could cause the other banks to fail, setting off a chain reaction.  In the U.S. financial 
system, two institutions stand out for the risk associated with their size:  Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the two semiofficial mortgage financiers.@); see also JAMES C. MILLER III & JAMES 
E. PEARCE, REVISITING THE NET BENEFITS OF FREDDIE MAC AND FANNIE MAE 30B32 (2006) 
(reviewing empirical literature relating to systemic risk posed by Fannie and Freddie). 
 144 The President=s 2007 budget, prepared by the Office of Management and Budget, defines 
systemic risk as: 
the risk that a failure in one part of the economy could lead to additional 
failures in other parts of the economyCthe risk that a small problem could 
multiply to a point where it could jeopardize the country=s economic well-
being.  The particular systemic risk posed by the GSEs is the risk that a 
miscalculation, failure of controls, or other unexpected event at one 
company could unsettle not only the mortgage markets but other vital parts 
of the economy. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:  BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 72 (2006). 
 145 See, e.g., Gup, supra note 143, at 304 (describing effect of federal regulations on 
investors= perceptions); Emil W. Henry Jr., Assistant Sec=y for Fin. Inst., U.S. Dep=t of the 
Treasury, Address Before the Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable 
(June 26, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4338.htm) (stating 
that Aas of December 31, 2005, commercial banks held $264 billion in GSE debt obligations . . . 
[which] exceeded 50 percent of capital for 54 percent of these commercial banks, and GSE debt 
obligations exceeded 100 percent of capital for 34 percent of these commercial banks.  In 
addition, the GSEs= interest rate positions are highly concentrated and pose significant risks to 
a number of large financial institutions.@); see also OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, 
SYSTEMIC RISK:  FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC AND THE ROLE OF OFHEO 113B14 (2003) 
(discussing actions OFHEO would take to reduce systemic disruption caused by financial 
difficulties at Fannie or Freddie). 
  As such, the significant ties that other entities have 
with Fannie and Freddie are actually encouraged by the federal 
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government itself, making the federal government appear to be 
responsible, at least in part, for resolving a potential systemic failure 
caused by the insolvency of Fannie, Freddie, or both.  If the 
government seeks to reduce the Too Big to Fail expectations 
surrounding Fannie and Freddie, it must start by stripping away the 
various regulatory privileges that signal to other financial 
institutions that Fannie and Freddie securities are safer than those 
of other private entities.146
Notwithstanding the explicit denial of a guarantee of Fannie and 
Freddie securities,
 
 IV.  THE ARGUMENT FOR THE IMPLIED GUARANTEE:  FANNIE AND 
 FREDDIE HAVE A PRIVILEGED STATUS COMPARED TO 
 OTHER PRIVATELY-OWNED COMPANIES 
 
147 market players will look beyond that to see 
what links exist between a GSE and its sovereign government in 
order to determine whether there is an implied guarantee.  Moody=s 
notes that A[t]o the extent the government exercises greater 
governance or regulatory control over a GSE, the greater may be the 
potential that it will have a stronger implied or >moral= obligation to 
provide assistance, if needed.@148  This is reflected in the market view 
that the relationship between the federal government and Fannie 
and Freddie has many indicia of Agovernance and regulatory control,@ 
as shall be seen below.149
                                                                                                                  
 146 Some might argue that Fannie and Freddie would be considered AToo Big to Fail@ even if 
these regulatory privileges were revoked.  Since the S&L crisis, the federal government has 
sought to reduce Too Big to Fail expectations for federally-related entities.  See generally Larry 
D. Wall, Too-Big-to-Fail After FDICIA, ECON. REV., Jan.BFeb. 1993, at 1, 1B14 (reviewing 
implementation of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which was 
designed in part to end Too Big to Fail expectations for large FDIC-insured financial 
institutions). 
 147 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 148 KRIZ, supra note 106, at 3 (AThe more severe these dislocations, the greater the potential 
likelihood of government support:  the cost of supporting the GSE may be cheaper than letting 
it fail and then having to incur the >clean-up= costs, which may be widespread given GSEs= 
often-key roles in national economies.  A nation=s pension funds and banks, for example, may be 
major GSE debtholders, and may even be encouraged to hold such obligations.  Furthermore, 
some governments impose lower capital charges on banks and other financial institutions for 
holdings of GSE obligations than for non-GSE corporate obligations--again implying a special, 
>protected= status for a GSE.  These dislocations could also include foreign affairs to the extent 
foreign central banks or other key overseas investors hold securities of the GSE, or to the extent 
a GSE=s failure could adversely affect foreigners= willingness to hold direct government, or 
government-related, debt.@). 
 149 See Part IV. 
  Indeed, the level of control is so great that 
the federal government may have more than a Amoral obligation@ to 
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provide them with assistance; it could arguably have a legal 
obligation. 
Stanton and Carnell, among others, have addressed the web of 
relationships between the federal government on the one hand and 
Fannie and Freddie on the other.150
Fannie and Freddie are granted a unique set of privileges by their 
federal charters.
  But no one has provided an 
exhaustive and in-depth description of this web and evaluated its 
legal significance as a whole.  In this Part, I will do so. 
 
A. FANNIE=S AND FREDDIE=S CHARTERS GRANT THEM UNEQUALED 
PRIVILEGES AMONG PRIVATELY-OWNED COMPANIES 
 
151  These privileges have been the basis of the many 
arguments that Fannie and Freddie=s obligations are guaranteed by 
the federal government.152
1. Congress Created Fannie and Freddie to Achieve a Public 
Purpose.  Fannie and Freddie are unlike other publicly traded 
corporations in that they were created and designed to achieve a 
public purpose, in addition to the traditional profit-maximization 
that private corporations engage in.
  The explicit disclaimers in their enabling 
statutes, however, undercut these arguments.  This part outlines the 
charter privileges and explains how they support the argument that 
the federal government does in fact guarantee Fannie=s and Freddie=s 
obligations. 
153
a. Fannie and Freddie Were Designed to Create a National 
Mortgage Market.  In creating Fannie Mae, Congress declared that it 
was guided by the following purposes:  to establish secondary market 
 
                                                                                                                  
 150 See STANTON, supra note 30, at 204 (AMany elements of the implicit federal 
guarantee . . . are found in the enterprise charter acts.@); Carnell, supra note 22, at 581B82 
(AFederal statutes give GSEs various benefits unavailable to ordinary private firms.@). 
 151 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 134, at 14 (stating that Fannie=s and Freddie=s 
Aadvantages have not been granted to any other shareholder-owned companies@); KRIZ, supra 
note 106, at 1 (AMost GSEs are created by and governed under special statutes, and not under 
general business incorporation laws.  Thus, GSEs may have powers, governance regimes or 
bankruptcy provisions that differ from most other corporations.@).  The CBO concludes that, 
A[t]he law treats the GSEs as instrumentalities of the federal government, rather than as fully 
private entities.@  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 134, at 13. 
 152 See, e.g., supra notes 124B27 and accompanying text.  The charters are not wholly 
blessings:  they are rigid and limit the businesses that Fannie and Freddie can enter into.  See 
STANTON, supra note 30, at 58B60 (AThe charter provisions are quite specific.@). 
 153 See, e.g., THOMAS H. STANTON, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:  MERCANTILIST 
COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD 13B22, 49B62 (2002) (discussing unique characteristics of 
GSEs). 
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facilities for residential mortgages; to provide stability in the 
secondary market for residential mortgages; to provide ongoing 
assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages, 
particularly mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-income 
families; to increase the liquidity of mortgage investments and to 
improve the distribution of investment capital available for 
residential mortgage financing; and to Apromote access to mortgage 
credit throughout the Nation . . . by increasing the liquidity of 
mortgage investments.@154  The Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 updated the goals of Fannie 
and Freddie as follows:  Ato provide stability in the secondary market 
for home mortgages@; Ato respond appropriately to the private capital 
market@; and Ato provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market 
for home mortgages,@ particularly those securing affordable 
housing.155
While commentators generally agree that Fannie and Freddie 
have created a liquid RMBS market,
 
156 leading critics of the 
companies argue that Fannie and Freddie lag behind ordinary banks 
when it comes to providing financing to low- and moderate-income as 
well as minority families157 and have failed to appreciably increase 
the rate of American homeownership.158
                                                                                                                  
 154 12 U.S.C. ' 1716 (2006). 
 155 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 ' 731. 
 156 See, e.g., Jay Cochran, III & Catherine England, Neither Fish nor Fowl:  An Overview of 
the Big-Three Government-Sponsored Enterprises in the U.S. Housing Finance Markets 1 
(Mercatus Ctr., Working Papers in Regulatory Studies, 2001), available at http://www.merca 
tus.org/repository/docLib/MC_RSP_RP-FishNorFowl_011115.pdf (A[T]here is little doubt that 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System (the third housing GSE) 
have contributed to one of the most dynamic mortgage markets in the world.@). 
 157 WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 13.  They conclude that A[t]his should be a 
lesson to lawmakers that attempting to turn shareholder-owned companies into government 
agencies is bound to fail.@  Id. at 20; see also Frame & White, supra note 67, at 173 (AFannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac do not do an especially good job of focusing on the low- and moderate-
income first-time buyer, where the social argument for support of homeownership is 
strongest.@). 
  Nonetheless, Fannie and 
Freddie are clearly instruments of federal policy. 
 158 See Frame & White, supra note 67, at 172 (AWhile some research has found that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have recently increased the supply of mortgage credit available to low- 
and moderate-income households, it does not appear that the companies= activities have 
appreciably affected the rate of homeownership in the United States.@); see also Xudong An & 
Raphael W. Bostic, GSE Activity, FHA Feedback, and Implications for the Efficacy of the 
Affordable Housing Goals, 36 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 209, 223 (2008) (reviewing research 
that finds that Fannie and Freddie have responded positively to their affordable housing goals, 
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b. The President Has the Power to Appoint Five of the Members 
of Fannie=s and Freddie=s Boards of Directors.  The President of the 
United States has the power to appoint five of the eighteen members 
of Fannie=s and Freddie=s Boards of Directors,159
at least 1 person from the homebuilding industry, at 
least 1 person from the mortgage lending industry, at 
least 1 person from the real estate industry, and at 
least 1 person from an organization that has represented 
consumer or community interests for not less than 2 
years or 1 person who has demonstrated a career 
commitment to the provision of housing for low-income 
households.
 a characteristic of 
Fannie and Freddie that certainly distinguishes them from other 
publicly traded corporations.  The Presidential appointments have a 
clear policy objective, as the enabling statutes require that members 
appointed to the Freddie Board by the President include: 
 
160




161  Fannie Mae has a comparable provision for 
appointment and removal of directors.162  This further demonstrates 
the power that the federal government has in setting the direction of 
the two GSEs.  While one might question whether Presidential board 
appointments is a Aprivilege@ per se, there is no question that it 
signals that Fannie and Freddie are materially different from other 
publicly traded corporations and that they have, effectively, a direct 
line to the President right in the board room.163
                                                                                                                  
but finding that implementing those goals and those of FHA Awork in opposite directions and 
can leave credit supply and homeownership unchanged or possibly even reduced@).  But see 
Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impacts of Affordable Lending Efforts on Homeownership Rates, 
12 J. HOUSING ECON. 29 (2003) (Freddie Mac-supported research finding that GSE activities 
increase rate of homeownership, particularly among minorities). 
 159 12 U.S.C. ' 1452(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. ' 1452(a)(2)(B). 
 162 See id. ' 1723(b) (showing requirements for board of directors). 
 
 163 See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 
543, 587B89 (discussing ambiguous nature of presidential appointees to federal government 
corporate boards).  President George W. Bush has chosen not to make appointments to the 
boards of Fannie and Freddie, Alex J. Pollock, The Housing GSEs:  Through Competition to 
Privatization, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Wash., D.C.), 
Aug. 1, 2004, at 4, consistent with his desire to signal that there is no implied guarantee of 
Fannie and Freddie=s obligations, cf. Lawrence J. White, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
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2. Congress Exempted Fannie and Freddie from Many Laws.  
Fannie=s and Freddie=s charters exempt them from the reach of many 
investor protection and state laws.  These exemptions both 
emphasize their special status and give them competitive advantages 
over other financial companies. 
a. Fannie and Freddie Are Exempt Under the Securities Acts.  
As issuers of exempt securities, Fannie and Freddie are not required 
to register with the SEC.164  Securities issued or guaranteed by 
Freddie are Adeemed to be exempt securities within the meaning of 
the laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission,@ 
to the same extent as Asecurities that are direct obligations of or 
obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United 
States.@165  Fannie=s enabling act has a comparable provision.166  This 
not only saves Fannie and Freddie the registration fees that the SEC 
charges securities issuers,167
                                                                                                                  
Housing Finance:  Why True Privatization is Good Public Policy, 528 POL=Y ANALYSIS 17 n.7 
(2004) (AIn 2004 the Bush administration announced that it would cease appointing any 
members to either board, as an effort to begin to reduce the special status of the two 
companies.@). 
 164 See 15 U.S.C. ' 78m(a) (2006) (requiring every security issuer to file with SEC).  If a 
securities issuer only issues Aexempted securities,@ it need not register with the SEC, as 
required by 15 U.S.C. ' 78L.  Id. '' 78L, 78o(d); see also ' 78c(12)(A)(i) (defining Aexempted 
securities@ to include Agovernment securities@); id. ' 78c(42)(C) (defining Agovernment securities@ 
to include Fannie and Freddie securities).  Professor Carnell argues that Fannie and Freddie 
securities also are exempt pursuant to 15 U.S.C. ' 77c(a)(2) because they are 
Ainstrumentalities@ of the United States.  Carnell, supra note 22, at 581 n.97.  Fannie and 
Freddie have been moving toward voluntary registration with the SEC in response to 
congressional critics.  See Allison Bisbey Colter, Freddie Sees Dividends and Buybacks, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 5, 2005, at B3A (A[Freddie and Fannie] under pressure from Congress, agreed 
in 2002 to voluntarily register their stock . . . .@). 
 165 12 U.S.C. ' 1455(g) (granting Freddie exemption for all Asecurities issued or guaranteed 
by the Corporation (other than securities guaranteed by the Corporation that are backed by 
mortgages not purchased by the Corporation)@).  The laws administered by the SEC are the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. '' 77aB77bbbb (2006) and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, id. '' 78aB78mm. 
 166 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1719(d), (e) (expressly exempting from SEC regulation various Fannie 
Mae securities Awhich are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed@ by United States); id. 
' 1723c (AAll stock, obligations, securities, participations, or other instruments issued pursuant 
to this subchapter [relating to Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae] shall, to the same extent as 
securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by 
the United States, be deemed to be exempt securities within the meaning of laws administered 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission.@). 
 but it may also allow them to withhold 
 167 See Dawn Kopecki & Patrick Barta, Mortgage Firms= Stance Is Disputed, WALL ST. J., 
May 7, 2003, at B7 (estimating Fannie and Freddie fees of $16.2 million if they had been 
required to register with SEC).  Fannie and Freddie have begun to voluntarily register with the 
SEC.  Testimony Concerning the Application of Federal Securities Law Disclosure and Reporting 
Requirements to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks Before the S. 
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sensitive financial information that other companies must release as 
part of their SEC filings.168
[S]pecial treatment of GSE securities in federal law 
signals to investors that those securities are relatively 
safe.  Investors might reason, for instance, that if the 
securities were risky, the government would not have 
exempted them from the protective safeguards it put in 
place to prevent losses of public and private funds.
  This, of course, gives Fannie and Freddie 
a significant advantage in developing their business strategies.  The 
Congressional Budget Office has stated that: 
 
169
b. Fannie and Freddie Are Exempt from Most State and Local 
Taxes.  Fannie and Freddie are generally exempt from state and local 




                                                                                                                  
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Alan L. 
Beller, Director, SEC Division of Corporation Finance). 
 168 See Patrick Barta, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae Face Disclosure Rules, WALL ST. J., July 2, 
2002, at A2 (AMany bond investors say they believe Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac don=t want to 
register because it would possibly require them to disclose more information about the loans 
they put in their mortgage-backed security pools.  Investors have long complained that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac don=t provide enough detail about their loans, including whether they are 
considered >prime= or >subprime=; such information is considered by some to be vital in 
determining the value of the loans.@).  It should be noted that Fannie and Freddie have 
disclosure requirements that private companies do not, such as those imposed by OFHEO 
pursuant to its authority under the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act of 1992.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. ' 4513 (authorizing director of OFHEO to require 
Fannie and Freddie to submit certain financial reports). 
 169 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 134, at 14.  The CBO continues, AThis implied 
assurance appears to outweigh the explicit disavowal of responsibility in every prospectus for 
GSE securities.@  Id.  Richard Carnell argues that: 
The GSEs= statutory exemption from the registration and reporting 
requirements of the federal securities laws is an anachronism and deserves 
to be repealed. The exemption sends the wrong signal:  that GSEs are so 
Aspecial,@ so close to the government, that investors in their securities have 
no need for the protections afforded by those requirements. 
Improving, supra note 73, at 18 (statement of Richard S. Carnell, Professor, Fordham 
University School of Law). 
  This is, of course, a dramatic 
 170 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1452(e) (exempting Freddie, Aincluding its franchise, activities, capital, 
reserves, surplus, and income,@  from Aall taxation now or hereafter imposed by any territory, 
dependency, or possession of the United States or by any State, county, municipality, or local 
taxing authority, except that any real property of the Corporation shall be subject to State, 
territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its value as other 
real property is taxed@); id. ' 1723a(c)(2) (exempting Fannie, Aincluding its franchise, capital, 
reserves, surplus, mortgages or other security holdings, and income,@ from Aall taxation now or 
hereafter imposed by any State, territory, possession, Commonwealth, or dependency of the 
United States, or by the District of Columbia, or by any county, municipality, or local taxing 
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and quantifiable advantage that Fannie and Freddie have over their 
competitors in the mortgage markets.  This is a benefit that is made 
available to certain other federally-chartered entities as well as 
instrumentalities of the federal government, further emphasizing the 
privileged status of Freddie and Fannie.171
c. Freddie and Fannie Are Exempt from Various Other Laws.  
At least since the Supreme Court ruled in McCulloch v. Maryland 
that the federally chartered Second Bank of the United States could 
not be impeded by the acts of a state, it has been clear that federally 
chartered entities could preempt state law.
 
172  This is an additional 
privilege of Fannie=s and Freddie=s that they can wield to their 
competitive advantage and that further reflects their special 
relationship with the federal government.173  Courts have also held 
that Freddie Mac benefits from sovereign immunity in certain 
contexts, such as finding that Freddie Mac could not be estopped by 
the actions of a third-party mortgage company acting beyond its 
authority because that would thwart Freddie=s congressionally 
prescribed purposes.174
                                                                                                                  
authority, except that any real property of the corporation shall be subject to State, territorial, 
county, municipal, or local taxation to the same extent as other real property is taxed@).  Fannie 
and Freddie are not exempt from federal tax.  See Bradley K. Krehely, Note, Government 
Sponsored Enterprises:  A Discussion of the Federal Subsidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 6 
N.C. BANKING INST. 519, 530 (2002) (noting GSEs exemption from state and local, but not 
federal, tax). 
 171 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 870 (1824) (holding that 
federally chartered bank is exempt from state taxation). 
 172 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436B37 (1819) (A[T]he States have no 
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the 
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers 
vested in the general government.@). 
 173 See Carnell, supra note 22, at 581 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 
436B37) (discussing benefits of GSEs including ability to preempt state laws through federal 
charters); cf. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 134, at 14 (AGSE securities are . . . exempt from 
the provisions of many state investor protection laws.  Those advantages have not been granted 
to any other shareholder-owned companies.@). 
 174 See Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1140 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
Freddie Mac is federal instrumentality for estoppel purposes because it has congressionally 
mandated purpose of maintaining secondary mortgage market); McCauley v. Thygerson, 732 
F.2d 978, 981B82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that Congress intended Freddie Mac to be federal 
entity for purposes of estoppel claim in employment law context). 
 
In addition, Freddie Mac has explicit broad immunity to most 
laws pursuant to its enabling statute; Freddie=s rights and remedies 
are 
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immune from impairment, limitation, or restriction by or 
under . . . any law . . . which becomes effective after the 
acquisition by the Corporation of the subject or property 
on, under, or with respect to which such right or remedy 
arises or exists or would so arise or exist in the absence 
of such law . . . .175
Freddie is also Aauthorized to conduct its business without regard to 
any qualification or similar statute in any State.@
 
 
176  Fannie has a 
similar provision regarding state qualification statutes.177
a. The Secretary of the Treasury Is Authorized to Purchase 
Fannie and Freddie Debt.  The Secretary of the Treasury may 
purchase up to $2,250,000,000 of Freddie=s obligations.
 
3. Congress Treats Fannie and Freddie Like Extensions of the 
Federal Government.  Congress has mandated that various arms of 
the federal government including the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve Board, as well as federally regulated banks, give Fannie and 
Freddie a variety of privileges that are usually reserved for federal 
instrumentalities. 
178  Moreover, 
A[a]ll redemptions, purchases and sales by the Secretary of the 
Treasury@ of such obligations Ashall be treated as public debt 
transactions of the United States,@179 meaning that the federal 
government effectively converts those purchased obligations into 
obligations of the federal government itself because the Afaith of the 
United States Government is pledged to pay@ obligations and interest 
on the public debt.180  Fannie Mae=s enabling statute has analogous 
provisions.181
                                                                                                                  
 175 12 U.S.C. ' 1456(a). 
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. ' 1723a(a) (A[Fannie can] conduct its business without regard to any qualification 
or similar statute in any State of the United States . . . .@). 
 178 Id. ' 1455(c)(2). 
 179 Id. ' 1455(c)(5). 
 180 31 U.S.C. ' 3123(a) (2000). 
  Fitch Ratings has described the credit lines to Fannie 
 181 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1719(b) (prescribing which obligations Fannie is authorized to issue); id. 
' 1719(c) (authorizing Treasury to purchase Fannie=s authorized obligations and indicating that 
such purchases are to be treated as public debt transactions).  The Treasury Assistant 
Secretary for Financial Institutions, Emil W. Henry Jr. notes, however, that Aat least in the 
context of GSE reform legislation, the Treasury Department is on record suggesting that this 
line of credit will only be utilized under very limited circumstances such as a GSE emerging 
from receivership.@  Henry, supra note 121.  A Treasury report notes that in its Atransition to 
private ownership, Fannie Mae relied on interim borrowing from the Treasury.  Effective July 
1, 1969, Fannie Mae established a line of credit with a nationwide group of commercial banks.  
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and Freddie as being Amore symbolic than economically significant@ 
because the credit lines represent a small proportion of the two 
companies= outstanding debt.182
b. Fiduciaries May Invest in Fannie and Freddie=s Obligations 
As If They Were Government Securities.  Securities sold by Freddie 
pursuant to its enabling statute are Alawful investments, and may be 
accepted as security for all fiduciary, trust, and public funds, the 
investment or deposits of which shall be under the authority and 
control of the United States or any officers thereof.@
  The symbolism, however, is clear; 
the Treasury is explicitly authorized to come to the rescue of Fannie 
and Freddie in a way that other private companies can only dream 
of. 
183  Fannie has a 
comparable provision.184  Federal law also preempts state law so that 
Fannie and Freddie securities are eligible for investment to the same 
extent as Aobligations issued by or guaranteed as to principal and 
interest by the United States or any agency or instrumentality 
thereof.@185
                                                                                                                  
Since that time, Fannie Mae has not borrowed from the Treasury.@  U.S. DEP=T OF THE 
TREASURY, supra note 120, at A-97 n.5; see also Cochran & England, supra note 156, at 33 
(ANeither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac has ever drawn on its credit line, but its mere existence 
serves to reinforce the notion that an implied government guarantee stands behind GSE-issued 
debt.@). 
 182 See Fitch Ratings Definitions, supra note 118, at 3 (AFitch has stated previously that 
removal of the $2.25 billion line of credit at the Treasury likely would not warrant a rating 
action, in and of itself.@). 
 183 12 U.S.C. ' 1452(g); see also id. ' 1455(e)(1) (stating that Freddie=s enabling statute 
authorizes any person, trust, or organization to purchase, hold, or invest in Freddie=s 
obligations sold pursuant to that statute Ato the same extent that such person, trust, or 
organization is authorized under any applicable law to purchase, hold, or invest in obligations 
issued by or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof@).  Moreover, where AState law limits the purchase, holding, or 
investment in obligations issued by the United States by such a person, trust, or organization, 
such Corporation mortgages, obligations, and other securities shall be considered to be 
obligations issued by the United States for purposes of the limitation.@  Id. ' 1455(e)(1). 
 184 See id. ' 1723c (AAll obligations, participations, or other instruments issued by either 
[Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae] shall be lawful investments, and may be accepted as security for 
all fiduciary, trust, and public funds, the investment or deposit of which shall be under the 
authority and control of the United States or any officer or officers thereof. All stock, 
obligations, securities, participations, or other instruments issued pursuant to this subchapter 
shall, to the same extent as securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed 
as to principal or interest by the United States, be deemed to be exempt securities within the 
meaning of laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.@). 
 185 15 U.S.C. ' 77r-1(a)(1) (2006). 
  What is pertinent about this provision is that it explicitly 
compares Fannie and Freddie obligations to those of the United 
States and its agencies like Ginnie Mae, thereby signaling that the 
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former is as safe as the latter, notwithstanding any state law to the 
contrary.186
Moreover, notwithstanding any other provision of law, Aany 
institution, including a national bank or State member bank of the 
Federal Reserve System or any member of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, trust company, or other banking 
organization, organized under any law of the United States, 
including the laws relating to the District of Columbia, shall be 
authorized to purchase shares of common stock of [Fannie 
Mae] . . . .@
 
187  This is another strong vote of confidence in Fannie=s 
prospects.188
c. Federal Reserve Banks Act As Fannie and Freddie=s Fiscal 
Agents.  The Federal Reserve Banks are required by statute to act as 
fiscal agents for Fannie and Freddie.
 
189  This is a role that the 
Federal Reserve Banks primarily play for the federal government.190
                                                                                                                  
 186 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 187 12 U.S.C. ' 1718(d); see also 12 U.S.C. ' 1464(c)(1)(D) (allowing federal savings 
association to buy Fannie Mae stock); see also id. ' 1464(c)(1)(E) (allowing federal savings and 
loans to buy Freddie Mac preferred stock).  As a general rule, banks are barred from owning 
stock or other equity stakes in for-profit corporations.  Patricia A. McCoy, BANKING LAW 
MANUAL:  FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS 
' 7.03 (2d ed. 2003). 
 188 Not everyone is sanguine about the outlook for Fannie and Freddie stock performance:  a 
former Federal Reserve economist found that Fannie and Freddie equity shares are vulnerable 
to increases in short-term interest rates and changes in the spread between long-term and 
short-term interest rates.  Frank A. Schmid, Stock Return and Interest Rate Risk at Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan.BFeb. 2005, at 35, 35. 
 189 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1452(d) (allowing Freddie to appoint Federal Reserve Bank as its fiscal 
agent); id. ' 1723a(g) (authorizing and directing Federal Reserve banks to act as Fannie=s fiscal 
agent). 
 190 31 C.F.R. ' 306.0, n.1 (2007) (stating that fiscal agent regulations governing U.S. 
securities apply to most U.S. transferable and nontransferable securities but that they also may 
be Aapplied to securities issued by certain agencies of the United States and certain 
Government and Government-sponsored corporations@).  As fiscal agents, Athe Reserve Banks 
maintain securities issued by GSEs and international organizations on the Fedwire Securities 
Service and make interest and redemption payments to depository institutions on each issuer=s 
behalf, in addition to providing other payment services generally related to these fiscal agency 
services.@  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement on Payments 
System Risk, at 2 n.3 (Docket No. OP-1182, Sept. 23, 2004), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/Other/2004/20040923/attachment.pdf. 
 
 Again, Fannie and Freddie are known by the company they keep; 
they are treated like the federal government in this context as well. 
 
 *  *  * 
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The privileges identified in the Fannie and Freddie charters make 
it abundantly clear that Fannie and Freddie not only are favored 
entities, but also that the federal government encourages other 
financial institutions to see them as such.  That being said, the 
explicit language in Fannie=s and Freddie=s charters, to be included 
on their securities, states that their Aobligations, together with the 
interest thereon, are not guaranteed by the United States and do not 
constitute a debt or obligation of the United States or of any agency 
or instrumentality thereof other than the corporation.@191  This denial 
of a guarantee is augmented by the Congressional findings contained 
in the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness 
Act of 1992, which state that Fannie and Freddie are not Abacked by 
the full faith and credit of the United States.@192
In addition to the unique privileges contained within their 
charters, Fannie and Freddie have been granted a series of 
regulatory privileges in a number of other federal statutes and 
regulations.  The Federal Reserve Board (FRB), in particular, treats 
them like extensions of the federal government.
  This language 
appears to counter any argument that the Fannie and Freddie 
charters are the basis of a legally enforceable guarantee.  But still, 
the regulatory environment in which they operate cuts in the other 
direction. 
 
B. OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS GRANT FANNIE AND 
FREDDIE A PRIVILEGED STATUS 
 
193  The net result of 
the regulatory environment created by these statutes and 
regulations is the enhancement of Athe perception that Fannie Mae=s 
securities are Federal agency issues.@194  The same logic applies to 
the perception of Freddie=s securities.  The market understands this 
web of privileges to constitute an implied guarantee of Freddie and 
Fannie=s obligations.195
                                                                                                                  
 191 See sources cited supra note 9. 
 192 12 U.S.C. ' 4501. 
 193 See infra Part IV.B.1.  The FRB has restricted some of these privileges in recent years.  
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 190 (limiting GSE intra-day 
overdraft privileges). 
 194 U.S. DEP=T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 120, at A-14. 
 
 195 See, e.g., Cochran & England, supra note 156, at 34 (AAll of these provisionsCfrom 
depository institutions= ability to hold unlimited amounts of GSE debt to the GSEs access to the 
Federal Reserve and the federal agency debt marketsCexpand the market for GSE paper and 
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1. The Federal Reserve Board Treats Fannie and Freddie 
Securities Like Government Securities.  The Federal Reserve Board 
grants Fannie and Freddie significant privileges conferring a status 
upon them akin to instrumentalities of the federal government.196  
Federal Reserve Banks accept Fannie and Freddie=s debt as 
collateral for discount window loans.  To do this, the Federal Reserve 
rules interpret the phrase, Adirect obligation of, and obligation fully 
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States@ from 
section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act to include Fannie and 
Freddie obligations.197  Other acceptable collateral includes U.S. 
Treasuries, state and local government securities, and certain 
collateralized obligations.198  Given that not all of Fannie and 
Freddie=s debt is collateralized, this broad reading of section 14(b) is 
an extraordinary vote of confidence in the two companies by the 
Federal Reserve, and provides additional support for the existence of 
the implied guarantee because it equates Fannie and Freddie 
securities with government securities.199
                                                                                                                  
enhance its liquidity relative to corporate debt of similar grade and maturity. . . . [T]hese 
privileges do more than just confer a funding cost advantage on the GSEs.  They also reinforce 
the perception of a federal guarantee on GSE debt obligations.@). 
 196 See STANTON, supra note 30, at 204 (A[T]he rules and regulations of government agencies 
like . . . the Federal Reserve Board may confer federal agency status on enterprise obligations 
and securities for specific purposes.@). 
 197 12 U.S.C. ' 347 (governing advances to member banks); id. ' 355(2) (also known as 
section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act) (stating that every Federal Reserve Bank shall have 
power to Abuy and sell in the open market . . . any obligation which is a direct obligation of, or 
fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the United States@); 12 C.F.R. ' 
201.108(b) (2007) (interpreting ' 355 to encompass Fannie and Freddie securities).  Member 
institutions borrow funds at the discount rate at the Federal Reserve=s discount window.  The 
Discount Window-Fedpoints-Federal Reserve Bank of New York, http://www. 
newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed18.html (last visited July 1, 2008).  The discount rate is 
the interest rate that the Federal Reserve Banks charge to member institutions, and typically 
refers to the primary rate (as opposed to the secondary rate) charged Ato depository institutions 
with strong financial positions and ample capital.@  Id.  Discount window loans Aare secured by 
collateral that exceeds the amount of the loans.@  Id.; see also FED. RESERVE SYS., ALTERNATIVE 
INSTRUMENTS FOR OPEN MARKET AND DISCOUNT WINDOW OPERATIONS 1B15 (2002) (discussing 
use of discount window). 
 198 See 12 C.F.R. ' 201.108(d) (listing obligations eligible as collateral for advances); FED. 
RESERVE SYS., supra note 197, at 1B15 (discussing broader framework for eligible collateral 
under Federal Reserve).  AIn 1999, the Federal Reserve expanded the range of acceptable 
collateral to include such items as investment-grade certificates of deposit and AAA-rated 
commercial mortgage-backed securities.@  The Discount Window-Fedpoints-Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, supra note 197. 
  It is also evidence that the 
 199 See 12 U.S.C. ' 347 (A[A]ny Federal reserve bank may make advances for periods not 
exceeding ninety days to its member banks on their promissory notes secured by such notes, 
drafts, bills of exchange, or bankers= acceptances as are eligible for rediscount or for purchase by 
2008] FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 1063 
 
institutional support within the federal government for Fannie and 
Freddie extends beyond Congress and includes the Federal Reserve 
as well. 
2. Fannie and Freddie=s Securities Are Eligible for Unlimited 
Investment by Federally Regulated Lenders.  Federally regulated 
lenders, including national banks, federal savings associations, and 
federal credit unions, can make unlimited investments in Fannie and 
Freddie obligations, in contrast to the more restricted ability of those 
entities to invest in the obligations of other publicly traded 
corporations.200  National banks are barred from dealing in securities 
for their own account except with the permission of the Comptroller 
of the Currency.201
                                                                                                                  
Federal reserve banks under the provisions of this [Act] or secured by such obligations as are 
eligible for purchase under section 355 of this title.@); id. ' 355 (providing for purchase and sale 
by Federal reserve banks of Aobligations of National, State, and municipal governments@).  12 
C.F.R. ' 201.108(b) interprets ' 355 to mean that obligations of Fannie and Freddie are among 
the principal agency obligations eligible as collateral for advances, along with the obligations of 
Ginnie Mae and the U.S. Postal Service among other agencies.  12 C.F.R. ' 201.108(b).  Section 
201.108(c) continues:  
Nothing less than a full guarantee of principal and interest by a Federal 
agency will make an obligation eligible.  For example, mortgage loans 
insured by the Federal Housing Administration are not eligible since the 
insurance contract is not equivalent to an unconditional guarantee and does 
not fully cover interest payable on the loan. Obligations of international 
institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, are also not 
eligible, since such institutions are not agencies of the United States. 
Id. ' 201.108(c).  This is a striking statement by the Federal Reserve, equating Fannie and 
Freddie obligations with those of federal agencies. 
 200 See GSE Oversight:  The Need for Reform and Modernization:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 33-34 (2003) (statement of Dr. Jay Cochran, 
Mercatus Center at George Mason University), available at http://financialservices.house. 
gov/media/pdf/062503jc.pdf (ABanks and S&Ls may hold GSE securities in unlimited amounts.  
Normally, banks face strict limits on the amount they can lend to a single borrower.  This 
safeguard is designed to protect the bank=s solvency in the event a borrower defaults. The 
exceptions to these lending limits are U.S. Treasury debt and GSE debt.@); STANTON, supra note 
30, at 204 (describing implicit guarantee of enterprise obligations).  See generally McCoy, supra 
note 187, ' 7.03 (explaining securities powers of banks). 
 201 12 U.S.C. ' 24; see id. ' 335 (AState member banks [of the Federal Reserve System] shall 
be subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to the purchasing, selling, 
underwriting, and holding of investment securities and stock as are applicable in the case of 
national banks under paragraph >Seventh= of section 24 of this title.@).  The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 has liberalized these limitations somewhat by allowing commercial banks to 
have securities underwriting affiliates.  See generally McCoy, supra note 187, '' 7.02B7.03 
(discussing impact of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
  The limitations and restrictions placed on 
national banks regarding dealing in and underwriting securities 
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exclude certain types of obligations, including certain obligations of, 
among others, the United States, the United States Postal Service, 
various government authorities, various entities insured by the 
federal government, and Ginnie Mae.202  Added to this list are the 
obligations of Fannie and Freddie (as well as the Federal Home Loan 
Banks (FHLBs)).203
The Home Owners= Loan Act (HOLA) makes similar provisions for 
federal savings associations.  A federal savings association can invest 
without limitation in obligations of Fannie and Freddie.
  Treating the obligations of these two publicly 
traded corporations the same as those of these ultra-safe 
government, government-insured and government-directed entities 
clearly telegraphs that Fannie and Freddie have an important public 
purpose that the United States stands behind. 
204  Indeed, 
HOLA refers to the Aobligations, participations, securities, or other 
instruments issued by, or fully guaranteed as to principal and 
interest by [Fannie Mae]@ as government securities.205  The Federal 
Credit Union Act contains similar provisions, allowing federal credit 
unions to invest unlimited funds in obligations of Fannie and 
Freddie, as well as a variety of federally-sponsored and guaranteed 
institutions.206
                                                                                                                  
 202 See 12 U.S.C. ' 24 Seventh (also listing obligations of Environmental Financing 
Authority, public housing agencies, and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 
among others). 
 203 Id.  Notwithstanding these limitations, banks Amay offer discount and full-service 
securities brokerage . . . [and] engage in the private placement of securities.@  McCoy, supra note 
187, ' 7.03.  They may also invest in Aa wide variety of debt obligations, other than junk bonds,@ 
a result partially brought about by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  Id. 
 204 See 12 U.S.C. ' 1464(c)(1)(D)B(F); see also id. (allowing for FHLB investments).  Other 
possible unlimited investments for federal savings associations in unsecured obligations include 
United States securities; state securities; certain insured loans; loans to financial institutions 
supervised by the federal government and to brokers and dealers registered with the SEC; stock 
and partnership investments arising under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 as 
well as certain HUD insured and guaranteed investments; obligations of state housing 
corporations; certain small business related securities; credit card loans; and educational loans. 
 Id. ' 1464(c)(1).  Federal savings associations may make only limited investments in other 
corporate debt.  Id. ' 1464(c)(2)(D).  The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) also prohibits savings associations from acquiring below-
investment-grade securities, but makes an exception for securities of those entities, including 
Fannie and Freddie, that are enumerated in 12 U.S.C. ' 1464(c)(1)(D)B(F) and 12 U.S.C. 
' 1831e(d).  The other enumerated entities are federal home loan banks, Sallie Mae (when it 
was a GSE) and federal agencies.  Id. ' 1464(c)(1)(D)B(F). 
 205 Id. ' 1464(c)(1)(F). 
  The clear message of these statutes is that all of 
 206 Id. ' 1757(7)(E).  Other possible unlimited investments for federal credit unions include 
(i) obligations of the federal government or securities fully guaranteed as to principal and 
interest thereby; (ii) shares or accounts of S&L associations or mutual savings banks, the 
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these federally regulated lenders will not be put at risk by investing 
in Fannie and Freddie securities. 
3. Fannie and Freddie Have Weaker Capital Requirements Than 
Other Financial Institutions.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are only 
required to hold 2.5% of their capital against mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities retained in their portfolios.207  Other 
financial institutions typically have higher capital requirements.208  
This disparity translates to a dramatic benefit because it allows 
Fannie and Freddie to leverage their investments more than other 
financial institutions.  Such leverage can lead to much greater profits 
and, it should also be noted, losses.209
Fannie and Freddie are exempt from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
financial privacy restrictions.
 
4. Fannie and Freddie Have a Variety of Additional Unique 
Privileges.  Fannie and Freddie have an array of privileges scattered 
throughout the web of federal law and regulation.  For instance, they 
are exempt from certain privacy restrictions and creditworthiness 
requirements.  These privileges further support the existence of the 
implied guarantee.  First, these privileges grant competitive 
advantages.  Second, creditworthiness exemptions signal that Fannie 
and Freddie obligations pose no risk of default. 
210
                                                                                                                  
accounts of which are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (iii) obligations issued by federal land banks, federal 
intermediate credit banks, or designated wholly owned Government corporations; (iv) 
obligations, participations, or other instruments of or issued by, or fully guaranteed as to 
principal and interest by Ginnie Mae; (v) obligations, participations, securities, or other 
instruments of, or issued by, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by any other 
agency of the United States; (vi) participation certificates evidencing beneficial interests in 
obligations, or in the right to receive interest and principal collections therefrom, which 
obligations have been subjected by one or more government agencies to a trust or trusts for 
which any executive department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (or the head 
thereof) has been named to act as trustee; (vii) shares or deposits of any central credit union in 
which such investments are specifically authorized by the board of directors of the federal credit 
union making the investment; (viii) shares, share certificates, or share deposits of federally 
insured credit unions; (ix) capital stock of the National Credit Union Central Liquidity Facility; 
and (x) obligations issued by federal home loan banks and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
 Id. ' 1757(7). 
 207 Frame & White, supra note 67, at 170. 
 208 See McCoy, supra note 187, ' 6.03 (reviewing capital requirements applicable to banks 
and thrifts). 
 209 See OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, supra note 145, at 15B17 (discussing 
impact of various financial crises on highly levered financial institutions).  The potential for 
greater losses leads, of course, to the potential for greater taxpayer exposure to the implied 
guarantee. 
  This exemption is another cost 
 210 15 U.S.C. ' 6809(3)(D) (2006) (exempting Fannie and Freddie from definition of 
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advantage that the federal government grants to Fannie and 
Freddie.211
HUD regulations group Fannie and Freddie, along with federal, 
state, and municipal governmental agencies, Federal Reserve Banks, 
and Federal Home Loan Banks, as Aapproved lender[s]@ for the 
purposes of certain mortgage and loan insurance programs, are 
exempt from the Anet worth requirement@ applicable to other 
Aapproved lender[s].@
  And it is another signal that Fannie and Freddie are 
Adifferent@ from other financial institutions and more like the 
government, thereby possibly enhancing the implied guarantee. 
212
Some of the privileges outlined above clearly support the existence 
of the implied guarantee.  For instance, the treatment of Fannie and 
Freddie securities like government securities, the eligibility of those 
securities for unlimited investment by federally regulated lenders, 
and Fannie and Freddie=s weaker capital requirements all send a 
clear message that investors can have faith in their creditworthiness. 
 Other privileges do not send such a clear message.  For instance, the 
presidential appointments to the board and Fannie=s and Freddie=s 
exemption from federal privacy law do not directly speak to the 
implied guarantee.  But that is mostly beside the point.  The first set 
of privileges so clearly creates the implied guarantee that the 
individual privileges of the second set have only marginal importance 
to the case for the implied guarantee.  And, at a minimum, the 
second set of privileges supports the Aweb@ theory of the implied 
guarantee promoted by many of those taking the market view on this 
issue.
  Again, the clear message here is that Fannie 
and Freddie are not at risk of defaulting on their obligations. 
 *  *  * 
213
                                                                                                                  
Afinancial institution@ for purposes of act so long as Fannie and Freddie Ado not sell or transfer 
nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party@); see also id. ' 6801(a) (stating 
that rationale of statute is to protect security and confidentiality of nonpublic personal 
information of financial institutions= customers). 
 211 MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS=N, supra note 68, at 4 (ALess expensive access to vast amounts 
of personal consumer information is another anti-competitive benefit the GSEs enjoy as a result 
of their loan underwriting technology.@). 
 212 24 C.F.R. ' 202.10(a) (2007).  Fannie and Freddie also are excluded from the definition of 
servicer for certain purposes of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.  12 U.S.C. 
' 2605(i)(2) (2006).  This exclusion thereby reduces the applicability of the Homeowners 
Protection Act, which relates to the regulation of private mortgage insurance, to Fannie and 
Freddie.  See id. ' 4901(16) (AThe term >servicer= has the same meaning as in [12 U.S.C. 
' 2605(i)(2)], with respect to a residential mortgage.@). 
 213 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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C. THE STRONG CLAIM:  THE IMPLIED GUARANTEE IS A LEGAL 
OBLIGATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 
The securities disclaimer language in the Fannie and Freddie 
charters denying the existence of a federal guarantee of their 
obligations presents a difficultCperhaps insurmountableChurdle to 
the claim that the federal government is legally required to 
guarantee those obligations.  But given the conflict between that 
language and the regulatory environment described above, it is 
worth at least vetting the case. 
1. The Lack of a Provision for Receivership Demonstrates That 
Congress Does Not Contemplate That Fannie and Freddie Can 
Become Insolvent.  Professor Carnell has documented that no 
adequate insolvency mechanism exists for Fannie and Freddie 
because, A[u]nlike ordinary business firms, they cannot liquidate or 
reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code.@214  The very fact that there 
is no such mechanism supports the notion that there is an implied 
guarantee because Congress would only have omitted such a 
mechanism if it did not expect that the two companies could fail.  
This state of affairs helps to feed the Too Big to Fail mentality 
regarding Fannie and Freddie discussed above.215
2. The Statutory Disclaimer of a Guarantee Is Ambiguous.  Fannie 
and Freddie are just two of a number of GSEs, each with its own 
 
                                                                                                                  
 214 Carnell, supra note 22, at 567.  A conservator could be appointed, but that would not 
address more serious financial distress.  Id. (AIf Fannie or Freddie became sufficiently troubled, 
its regulator could appoint a >conservator= to take control of the firm and attempt to restore the 
firm=s financial health.  But by then the firm=s problems could well have become too severe for a 
conservator to resolve.  The conservator would have only limited powers.@). 
 215 See supra notes 137B46 and accompanying text; see also Proposals, supra note 120, at 12 
(statement of David F. Wilson, National Association of Home Builders) (ALast year, some, 
including Standard and Poor=s (S&P), speculated that giving receivership powers to the new 
GSE regulator would cause investors to abandon their notion of an implicit guarantee and, as a 
result, increase their yield requirements on GSE mortgage-backed securities and debt.@); Brent 
W. Ambrose & Tao-Hsien Dolly King, GSE Debt and the Decline in the Treasury Debt Market, 34 
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 812, 816 (2002) (arguing that Athe extent to which the GSEs are 
able to increase the value of the conjectural guarantee, by either taking on more risk or 
increasing their size, they increase the perception that they are >too-big-to-fail= @).  The Too Big 
to Fail mentality also undercuts arguments for privatization.  WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, 
supra note 72, at 21 (AMost plans for the privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac founder 
on two shoals:  that the companies, when privatized, will still be so large as to be >too big to fail= 
and that privatization will disrupt the process of residential financing, thus harming the U.S. 
economy.@). 
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enabling statute.216  The enabling statutes of Fannie and Freddie do 
not explicitly state that their obligations are not obligations of the 
federal government:  they merely require that their obligations 
indicate on their face that there is no federal guarantee.217  Other 
GSEs, however, have explicit denials of liability in their enabling 
statutes in addition to any requirements that their obligations show 
such a disclaimer on their face.218  Thus, there is arguably some 
ambiguity as to whether the federal government actually disclaims 
liability for the obligations of Fannie or Freddie due to the absence of 
the explicit denial of a federal guarantee in their enabling 
statutes.219
The enabling act of the Farm Credit System explicitly states that 
the AUnited States shall not be liable or assume any liability directly 
or indirectly@ on the obligations of the Farm Credit System.
 
220  The 
Financing Corporation (FICO) and the Resolution Funding 
Corporation (REFCO) enabling statutes combine the Fannie/Freddie 
language and the Farm Credit System language; for instance, the 
FICO statute states that obligations of FICO Aand the interest 
payable on such obligations shall not be obligations of, or guaranteed 
as to principal or interest by, the Federal Home Loan Banks, the 
United States, or the [Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation] Resolution Fund and the obligations shall so plainly 
state.@221
Assuming that Congress intended there to be a difference between 
these three different approaches to the federal government=s 
responsibilities toward GSE obligations, it would seem that Congress 
intended for the Farm Credit System, FICO, and REFCO denials of 
 
                                                                                                                  
 216 Others include the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Financing Corporation, the 
Resolution Funding Corporation, the Farm Credit System, and Farmer Mac. 
 217 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. ' 1435 (AAll obligations of Federal Home Loan Banks shall plainly 
state that such obligations are not obligations of the United States and are not guaranteed by 
the United States.@); id. ' 2279aa-6(e)(3)(B) (stating that Farmer Mac obligations Ashall clearly 
indicate that the obligation is not an obligation of, and is not guaranteed as to principal and 
interest by, the Farm Credit Administration, the United States, or any other agency or 
instrumentality of the United States (other than the Corporation)@). 
 218 See sources cited infra notes 220B21. 
 219 I thank Larry Solan for suggesting this line of inquiry. 
 220 12 U.S.C. ' 2155(c). 
 221 Id. ' 1441(e)(6); see also id. ' 1441b(f)(10)  (AObligations of the Funding Corporation 
[REFCO] shall not be obligations of, or guaranteed as to principal by, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System, the Federal Home Loan Banks, the United States, or the Resolution Trust 
Corporation and the obligations shall so plainly state.@). 
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responsibility to be stronger than the Fannie/Freddie language.222  
This is particularly true because (i) the Farm Credit System 
language was enacted prior to the statute implementing Fannie and 
Freddie=s current regulatory regime;223 (ii) the Farm Credit System, 
FICO and REFCO statutes were amended (in the case of the Farm 
Credit System)224 or enacted (in the case of FICO225 and REFCO226) 
after the Fannie/Freddie enabling statutes were enacted;227 and (iii) 
Congress has substantially amended the Fannie and Freddie 
statutes since the amendment of the Farm Credit System statute and 
the enactment of the FICO and REFCO statutes.228
It is difficult, of course, to understand what rationale Congress 
would have for such subtle differences between the statutes.  
Perhaps the best interpretation is that AHomer nodded@ and that 
there are no substantial differences among these statutes.  Another 
interpretation is that Congress intended to imply greater support for 
Fannie and Freddie than for other GSEs, such as the Farm Credit 
System, in order to promote the growth of owner-occupied housing, a 
  Thus, Congress 
is presumed to have had the opportunity to review the variations in 
the GSE enabling statutes relating to the denial of a federal 
guarantee and is therefore presumed to have intentionally chosen to 
implement these subtle differences. 
                                                                                                                  
 222 Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 291B94 (2006) (stating that Congress is presumed to know 
that a law will be interpreted in context of prior laws that had sections incorporated into more 
recent law). 
 223 Compare Farm Credit Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
' 2155(c)) (creating the Farm Credit System), with Federal Housing Enterprises Financial 
Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3941 (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. '' 4501B4641) (establishing, inter alia, risk-based and minimal capital standards for 
Fannie and Freddie). 
 224 See Farm Credit Administration Handbook, Statutes, http://www.fca.gov/download/ 
Statutes.pdf (last visited July 25, 2008) (listing amendments to Farm Credit Act of 1971). 
 225 See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 
(relevant section codified at 12 U.S.C. ' 1441(e)(6)). 
 226 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (relevant section codified at 12 U.S.C. '1441b(f)(10)). 
 227 See Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 304, 47 Stat. 725 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. ' 1435). 
 228 Compare Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3941 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. '' 4501B4641) (amending 
regulatory framework for Fannie and Freddie), with Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade 
Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-237, 105 Stat. 1818 (amending Farm Credit Act 
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583), Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (establishing FICO), and Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (establishing REFCO). 
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key goal of American housing policy.229  A third interpretation is that 
Congress required the Fannie/Freddie language to be placed on their 
securities in order to prevent third parties from having a cause of 
action based on the special status of Fannie and Freddie while 
leaving open the possibility that Fannie and Freddie, or the federal 
government itself, could plausibly assert that the federal government 
was authorized to guarantee Fannie/Freddie debt, if they were to 
become insolvent.230
The matter of interpretation is only complicated by the 
congressional findings contained in the Federal Housing Enterprises 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, which state that Fannie 




This title and the amendments made by this title may 
not be construed as obligating the Federal Government, 
either directly or indirectly, to provide any funds to the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal 
National Mortgage Association, or the Federal Home 
Loan Banks, or to honor, reimburse, or otherwise 
guarantee any obligation or liability of the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, or the Federal Home Loan Banks. 
 This title and the amendments made by this title may 
not be construed as implying that any such enterprise or 
Bank, or any obligations or securities of such an 
enterprise or Bank, are backed by the full faith and 
credit of the United States.
  The complication, of course, is that Congress could have 
incorporated into the statute language like that of the Farm Credit 
System, denying the existence of the guarantee.  But instead, 
Congress includes such a disclaimer in the findings contained in the 
preamble to the statute.  The meaning of the disclaimer gets even 
more complicated later in that statute, where Congress states that: 
 
232
                                                                                                                  
 229 See HUD FHA Celebrates Homeownership, http://www.hud.gov/initiatives/homeown 
ership/ (last visited July 20, 2008) (AHelping more low and moderate income Americans become 
homeowners is a national priority, especially first-time homebuyers and minority families.@). 
 230 The existence of Fannie=s and Freddie=s lines of credit with the Treasury supports this 
argument, as it is evidence that the enabling statute intended to give the federal government 
the authority to come to Fannie and Freddie=s rescue. 
 231 12 U.S.C. ' 4501(4). 
 232 Id. ' 4503. 
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This is oddly drafted because it does not explicitly deny the existence 
of the implied guarantee; it merely states that its source is not the 
1992 Act itself.  This odd drafting makes it appear as if Congress 
intended to maintain the ambiguity surrounding the implied 
guarantee that existed at the time the 1992 Act was being considered 
by Congress. 
One might also look to the legislative history of the Fannie and 
Freddie enabling statutes to determine whether Congress intended 
to guarantee their obligations.  There are some interesting aspects to 
the legislative history, including the fact that it was Abudget 
pressures from the Vietnam war@ that led Congress to transform 
Fannie Mae from a government corporation to an off-budget GSE.233
3. The Federal Government Could Be Estopped from Denying the 
Implied Guarantee.  The regulatory environment that the federal 
government has promulgated regarding Fannie and Freddie appears 
to firmly support the existence of the implied guarantee, 
notwithstanding the disclaimer language prescribed in Fannie=s and 
Freddie=s charters.  Nonetheless, it is very difficult as a general rule 
to assert promissory estoppel against the government.
  
But the legislative history is ultimately unsatisfying as it is 
ambiguous and conflicting.  If it demonstrates anything, it is that 
Congress did not focus on the implied guarantee and did not even 
begin to imagine that Fannie and Freddie would become the 
behemoths they are today. 
234
                                                                                                                  
 233 Robert Van Order, A Microeconomic Analysis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 23 
REGULATION 27, 28 (2000); see Froomkin, supra note 163, at 559 (A[Federal Government 
Corporations] classified as either mixed-ownership or private tend to be given >off budget= 
status.  Once excluded from the national accounts, their borrowing is not counted as part of the 
official measure of the federal deficit.  When Congress operates under spending caps or deficit 
reduction targets, pursuant to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction process for 
example, off-budget items are usually excluded from the official total >spent= by the government. 
 As a result, a few GSEs were created as little more than accounting devices designed to allow 
the federal government to borrow funds without appearing to increase the deficit.@ (citations 
omitted)).  
 234 See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver ' 139 (2000) (AA litigant asserting estoppel 
against the government bears a heavy burden, particularly when the government acts in a 
sovereign or governmental role rather than a proprietary role.  In fact, it has been held that 
estoppel may not be applied against the government acting in its sovereign capacity.  However, 
some courts do not apply a rigid distinction between sovereign and proprietary activities in 
determining the applicability of estoppel against the government, but instead hold that estoppel 
may be applied against the government even while exercising governmental functions under 
appropriate circumstances.@ (citations omitted)). 
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4. The Existence of a Legally Enforceable Implied Guarantee Is 
Irrelevant and, in Any Case, Would Never Be Reached by a Court.  
The case for a legally-binding guarantee appears weak.  This is, 
however, mostly irrelevant.  If injured parties needed to go to the 
court for redress, the delays, even the shortest delays, would wreak 
havoc on the global financial system.  The guarantee of payment is 
the most important aspect of the implied guarantee, but the 
guarantee of timely payment is of great importance as well.235  
Indeed, credit rating agencies value timeliness as a key component of 
creditworthiness.236  Fannie and Freddie guarantee the timely 
payment of their securities.237  This guarantee of timely payment is a 
significant part of the attraction of Fannie and Freddie obligations 
for investors and is integral to the market=s understanding of the 
implied guarantee.  If Fannie and Freddie found themselves unable 
to make timely payments on their obligations and the federal 
government did not provide them with the necessary funds to do so, 
it would likely set off a financial crisis that would be at least on par 
with the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management in the 
late 1990s.238
                                                                                                                  
  Moreover, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not apply to Fannie and Freddie.  
See Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that Freddie 
Mac Ais not a federal agency for purposes of the FTCA@); see also 28 U.S.C.S. ' 2680(h)B(i) (Lexis 
2006) (enumerating exceptions to FTCA for claims based on misrepresentation and fraud as 
well as claims Afor damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation 
of the monetary system@). 
 235 The Aprincipal credit risk of concern to the rating agencies is the possibility that cash 
flows may be impaired or interrupted . . . .@  JASON H.P. KRAVITT, SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL 
ASSETS ' 7.02[C] (2d ed. 2004 Supp.) (emphasis added). 
 236 See, e.g., Philippe Jorion et al., Informational Effects of Regulation FD:  Evidence from 
Rating Agencies, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 313 (2005) (A[Creditworthiness] has been defined by 
Moody=s [ ] as an >opinion of the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of a bond issuer 
or other obligor to make full and timely payments on principal and interest due to investors.= @ 
(emphasis added)). 
 237 See, e.g., Mortgage-Backed Securities:  Basics of Fannie Mae MBS, http://www.fannie 
mae.com/mbs/mbsbasics/remic/issuance.jhtml (last visited July 20, 2008) (noting that Fannie 
Mae REMICs Acarry a guaranty of timely payment of principal and interest@). 
 238 See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED:  THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (describing Long-Term Capital Management=s implosion); 
see also STANTON, supra note 30, at 26 (AThe government faces immense pressure to stand 
behind a failing government-sponsored enterprise, just as it ultimately guaranteed all of the 
obligations of the Continental Illinois Corporation, the large and completely private holding 
company parent of the Continental Illinois National Bank.  Only a small fraction of total 
Continental debt was held by depositors in the bank=s federally insured accounts.  The bank 
had about $40 billion in assets, making it a much smaller institution than are most enterprises 
today.@). 
  Given that Fannie and Freddie securities are 
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ubiquitous in the portfolios of investors throughout the world, it 
would likely be much worse.239
The federal government has never permitted a federally chartered 
corporation to fail from insolvency.
  Thus, the federal government is 
likely to act well before any court has had a chance to rule on the 
enforceability of the implied guarantee. 
 
D. THE WEAK CLAIM:  THE IMPLIED GUARANTEE IS A MORAL 
OBLIGATION THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MUST HONOR 
 
There is every reason to believe, as the market does, that the 
federal government will honor the implied guarantee.  First, 
Congress assisted Fannie Mae once before when it was insolvent.  
Second, Congress has bailed out other GSEs.  Third, the secondary 
impacts on the financial marketsCin addition to the likelihood of a 
global financial panic discussed aboveCwould be so severe that it is 
hard to imagine that the federal government would find them 
acceptable.  Underlying all of these arguments is the fact that nearly 
every federal law and regulation affecting Fannie and Freddie 
supports the markets= view that the federal government guarantees 
their obligations. 
240  In fact, the federal government 
bailed out Fannie Mae when it was insolvent on a market-value 
basis in the late 1970s and early 1980s.241
                                                                                                                  
 239 See Ruth Simon, James R. Hagerty & James T. Areddy, Housing-Bubble Talk Doesn=t 
Scare Off Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at A1 (discussing international demand for 
mortgage-backed securities); see also Henry, supra note 145 (A[T]he GSEs= interest rate 
positions are highly concentrated and pose significant risks to a number of large financial 
institutions.@). 
 240 STANTON, supra note 30, at 206. 
  In 1987, the federal 
 241 White, supra note 118, at 14 n.7.  But see Peter J. Wallison, The Evolution of a Policy 
Idea:  How Restrictions on the Size of the GSEs= Portfolios Became the Central Issue in Reform of 
Their Regulation, NETWORKS FIN. INST. 2006-PB-03, at 10 (2006), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=923571 (arguing that at time of Fannie Mae=s insolvency A[t]here was little doubt 
in the markets that the government could bail out Fannie Mae, if necessary, without creating a 
heavy cost to taxpayers.@).  The fact that Fannie Mae was insolvent on a market-value basis did 
not mean that it could not keep current with the payments on its due and payable obligations.  
Thus, this episode did not present the type of crisis that insolvency on a cash-flow basis would.  
Insolvency on a cash-flow basis would mean that Fannie was not able to keep current with its 
payments.  The bailout took the form of supervisory forbearance.  See Edward J. Kane & 
Chester Foster, Valuing Conjectural Government Guarantees of FNMA Liabilities, in BANK 
STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 347, 
348 (1986) (arguing that regulatory forbearance during Fannie Mae=s insolvency was unfair to 
taxpayers); Eisenbeis et al., supra note 118, at 6 n.10 (ADuring the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Fannie Mae was insolvent on a market value basis and benefited from supervisory 
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government also created a GSE, FICO, to take on the obligations of 
the insolvent Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC).242  Moody=s has stated that the Apast provision of 
government assistance to a GSE can not only boost a GSE=s current 
financial health, but more important it can indicate that further 
assistance could be forthcoming if required.  It can be a >test case= for 
implied support.@243
In 1987, Congress came to the rescue of the Farm Credit 
System.
  In addition to assisting Fannie Mae during its 
financial crisis, Congress has bailed out other GSEs. 
244  What is most important about the Farm Credit System 
bailout for the purposes of this Article is that the federal government 
Adeveloped and implemented a $4 billion bailout plan, confirming the 
capital markets= view about what the government would do if Fannie 
and Freddie were to experience financial difficulty.@245  Similarly, 
Congress authorized FICO to issue over eight billion dollars in bonds 
for the purpose of recapitalizing FSLIC.246  And when concern grew 
that FICO might default on these bonds, Congress enacted a law that 
reduced the risk of default.247  That action Aset an important 
precedent by reinforcing the bond markets= belief that the federal 
government stands behind the debt of any private firm it has 
established.@248
                                                                                                                  
forbearance.@).  It is worth noting, of course, that the federal government also bailed out the 
S&L industry at around the same period.  See Lawrence J. White, THE S&L DEBACLE 123B204 
(1991) (discussing regulatory response and cleanup of S&L industry). 
 242 See Competitive Equality Bank Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, Title III (codified at 12 
U.S.C. ' 1441 (2006)).  See generally White, supra note 241 (reviewing history of S&L crisis). 
 243 KRIZ, supra note 106, at 2.  One might think the fact that the federal government has 
previously bailed out Fannie would be dispositive as the existence of the implied guarantee.  I 
do not believe that is the case.  Chrysler, for instance, was bailed out by the federal government 
in the 1980s and is facing serious trouble once again; no one thinks that the federal government 
would bail out a manufacturing company again.  See Micheline Maynard, This Time, No 
Roadside Assistance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, ' 3, at 1 (ANo one is talking about a 
government-financed bailout to give Chrysler another chance . . . .@).  Thus, the previous bailout 
of Fannie Mae is best seen as an important, but not dispositive, fact. 
 244 WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 3; White, supra note 118, at 14 n.7.  For a 
history of the Farm Credit System bailout, see generally STANTON, supra note 30. 
 245 WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 3. 
 246 Keith J. Leggett & Robert W. Strand, The Financing Corporation, Government-
Sponsored Enterprises, and Moral Hazard, 17 CATO J. 179, 179 (1997). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id.  AThe 1996 lawCindeed the very fact that it was proposedCsets an important 
precedent.  Federal officials stated publicly that the reason the FICO bonds had to be protected 
was to ensure that the bond markets would not become concerned about debt issued by other 
GSEs.@  Id. at 182. 
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Obviously, these bailouts create a cycle of expectations.  At this 
point, a refusal to bail out a GSE Ais likely to cause severe credit 
shortages in the relevant markets and to cause a great decline in 
confidence in the other@ federal government corporations (including 
GSEs) that operate in the credit markets.249
This Article argues that Fannie and Freddie should be privatized 
and that the implied guarantee should thereby be terminated.  This 
is generally considered a political nonstarter, particularly because 
Fannie and Freddie have many allies in the Republican and 
Democratic parties.
  The implied guarantee, 
even if not a legal obligation, is real. 
 
 V.  THE IMPLIED GUARANTEE SHOULD BE TERMINATED 
 
250
As a result, there has been no shortage of relatively modest 
proposed responses to Fannie and Freddie=s privileged status.  These 
include limiting the size of their mortgage portfolios;
 
251 limiting their 
debt issuance;252 stripping GSEs of some of their unique privileges to 
signal to the market that the implied guarantee has been 
weakened;253 freezing the conforming loan value to limit the size of 
mortgages they can buy, thereby limiting their overall size;254 
requiring them to obtain ratings from rating agencies for their debt 
issuances that discount the implied guarantee;255 chartering 
additional GSE competitors to spread the risk that Fannie and 
Freddie pose as well as to erode their monopoly profits;256
                                                                                                                  
 249 Froomkin, supra note 163, at 580.  Froomkin uses the term Afederal government 
corporation@ to refer to a range of government-created corporations that are wholly-owned and 
partially-owned by the federal government as well as government-created corporations that are 
owned by private parties (e.g., Fannie and Freddie).  See id. at 546 (discussing federal 
government corporations). 
 250 See Lee & Dash, supra note 113 (noting many influential figures are involved with 
Fannie and Freddie). 
 251 Jaffee, supra note 116, at 1.   
 252 Proposals, supra note 120, at 10. 
 253 Kulp, supra note 117. 
 254 White, supra note 118, at 18 n.23. 
 255 STANTON, supra note 30, at 176. 
 imposing 
 256 STANTON, supra note 29, at 3; Oversight of the Government Sponsored Enterprises:  The 
Risks and Benefits to Consumers:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the 
Budget, and International Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 33 
(2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072103pollock.pdf (statement of Alex J. 
Pollock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago) (arguing 
that Federal Home Loan banks are natural competitors to Fannie and Freddie because, Adue to 
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user fees;257 regulating them as public utilities;258 and strengthening 
their subordinated debt programs.259  And Congress has recently 
considered a GSE reform bill that had garnered some bipartisan 
support.260  The bill would have only slightly increased the funding 
and supervisory power of OFHEO.261
Just as the FDIC managed Too Big to Fail expectations for the 
banks it regulates, the federal government needs to do the same 
thing for Fannie and Freddie:  privatization is needed to achieve this 
goal.  And while privatization is currently not being seriously 
considered by Congress, it has been a perennial topic at the highest 
levels of the federal government; indeed, the Treasury Department 
has argued across Democratic and Republican Administrations that 
it Ais appropriate to wean a GSE from Federal sponsorship once the 
GSE becomes economically viable and successfully fulfills the 
purpose for which it was created with Federal sponsorship, or when 
the purpose for which it was created ceases to exist.@
  But these proposals would not 
end the risk posed by the implied guarantee, particularly because 
Fannie and Freddie=s powerful lobbying forces would be sure to 
dilute any half-measures that were enacted as soon as the public=s 
focus shifted to other areas of concern. 
262
                                                                                                                  
the special privileges conferred in GSE charters, only a GSE has the ability to compete with 
another GSE in the business of funding long-term mortgages@). 
 257 James F. Gatti & Ronald W. Spahr, The Value of Federal Sponsorship:  The Case of 
Freddie Mac, 25 REAL EST. ECON. 453, 482 (1997) (proposing imposition of user fees to reduce 
cost of Fannie and Freddie subsidy). 
 258 STANTON, supra note 29, at 3. 
 259 Valerie L. Smith, Subordinated Debt Issuance by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 37B47 
(OFHEO Working Paper 07-3, 2007), available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/WorkingPap 
ers/workingpaper073.pdf.  Properly structured subordinated debt can be deployed to signal 
credit risk.  Id. 
 260 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 108B09 and accompanying text. 
 262 Joint Hearing on Privatizing Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) Before the 
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Training and Life-Long Learning of the H. Comm. on 
Economic and Educational Opportunities and the Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, 
Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Government Reform and 
Oversight, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Darcy Bradbury, Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Federal Finance, Department of Treasury); see also PRESIDENT=S COMM=N ON PRIVATIZATION, 
PRIVATIZATION:  TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 38 (1988) (recommending that Fannie 
and Freddie be fully privatized). 
   
Professor White has simply and elegantly framed the ideal 
privatization as follows: 
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Figuratively, public policy should shake the hands and 
pat the backs of the senior managements of the two 
companies (and their predecessors for the past three 
decades), praise them and tell them Ajob well done@ (for 
helping bring about the securitization revolution), and 
point them toward the Delaware Secretary of State=s 
office in Dover for their new corporate charters.263




264  First, to the extent that Fannie and Freddie play a 
role in stabilizing the residential mortgage markets, other federal 
instrumentalities would need to replace them.  Second, some studies 
indicate that the spreads for GSE securities would widen from 
twenty-two to sixty basis points from comparable Treasuries.265
                                                                                                                  
 263 White, supra note 118, at 17. 
 264 In addition to evaluating the costs and benefits to homeowners and taxpayers of 
privatizing Fannie and Freddie, scholars also have evaluated the costs and benefits to Fannie 
and Freddie and their shareholders of maintaining their privileged regulatory status.  See, e.g., 
Michael J. Lea, Privatizing a Government Sponsored Enterprise:  Lessons from the Sallie Mae 
Experience, NETWORKS FIN. INST. 2006-PB-09 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abst 
ract=923461.  This is important not only to ensure basic fairness to the company, its investors, 
and its employees, but also to ensure that GSEs that may be chartered in the future are not 
hamstrung by expectations of a Abait and switch@ by the government once they have achieved 
the goals Congress has set for them.  Cf. id. at 3 (AThree rationales emerged for the 
privatization of Sallie Mae.  First, the public policy purpose for which it was created had been 
achieved; second, investors faced a significant threat to the value of their investment from the 
political uncertainty surrounding the GSL program; and third, there were significant foregone 
opportunities associated with Sallie Mae=s restrictive charter.@).  The greatest cost of losing 
GSE status would be the increased cost of borrowing that they would face without the implied 
guarantee.  See id. at 6 (discussing up-front costs).  Fannie and Freddie also would face 
increased costs caused by the loss of their various privileges regarding taxes and securities 
regulation compliance discussed above.  See supra Part IV.A.  These lost privileges might be 
compensated by the increased freedom that Fannie and Freddie would have to compete with 
other financial institutions in new markets.  If the experience of Sallie Mae is any guide, this 
could be very valuable to Fannie and Freddie.  See Lea, supra, at 5 (describing new 
opportunities resulting from privatization). 
 265 Kulp, supra note 117.  A basis point is equal to one-hundredth of a percentage point.  
LEE GREMILLION, MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY HANDBOOK:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR 
INVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS 7 (2d ed. 2005).  Recent events provide some support for Fannie 
and Freddie=s claim that they provide liquidity when financial markets are in turmoil.  See 
Ruth Simon, Home Inequity:  Borrowers with Good Credit Are Paying Higher Rates on Jumbo 
Mortgages Because of Fallout from Subprime Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2007, at D1 (noting 
that Athe gap between the prices of jumbo and conforming mortgages has widened to 0.77 
percentage point, according to HSH Associates.  That=s up from a recent low of 0.17 percentage 
point and well above the 0.24-percentage-point average since 2000.@). 
  This 
will, of course, impact home owners who would pay slightly higher 
interest rates for their conforming mortgages.  These costs are quite 
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manageable for the typical homeowner, particularly given that he or 
she would be relieved of a proportionate share of the contingent 
liability represented by the implied guarantee that could result in 
higher taxes or reduced services if the federal government ever had 
to make good on the guarantee.266
Finally, Fannie and Freddie, because of their market dominance 
and their origins as government-created enterprises, have imposed 
pro-consumer terms on much of the residential mortgage market.
 
267  
Similarly, Fannie and Freddie have imposed a variety of best 
practices on secondary mortgage market players, like loan 
originators.268
There is a useful precedent for privatization.  In the mid-1990s, 
Congress commenced the process of privatizing Sallie Mae, a GSE 
that provided loans for higher education to students and their 
parents.
  These practices would need to be maintained through 
legislation or regulation as part of any privatization initiative. 
269  Sallie Mae=s managers and shareholders supported this 
process as their regulatory environment became less and less 
friendly.270  The privatization was accomplished with the creation of 
a non-GSE holding company which gradually rid itself of Sallie Mae=s 
GSE obligations.271  Once the GSE obligations were all satisfied, 
Sallie Mae became just another private company.  Both the ultimate 
privatization and the process of privatization were considered a great 
success by legislators and Sallie Mae=s employees and 
shareholders;272
                                                                                                                  
 266 Assuming an increased forty-one point spread (average of twenty-two and sixty) on a 
$200,000 mortgage, a borrower would pay an additional sixty-eight dollars each month in 
interest.  Kulp, supra note 117.  Fannie and Freddie shareholders also may suffer, of course, 
from the loss of the portion of the subsidy they retain, but such a result would be one of the 
intended effects of privatization.  It also might be offset by Fannie and Freddie=s ability to enter 
new lines of business once privatized. 
 267 See generally Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage 
Instruments:  The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077 (2007) (discussing 
benefits to homeowners). 
 268 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye:  Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2061, 2095 (2007) (describing due diligence best 
practices imposed by Fannie and Freddie). 
 269 See WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 25 (noting resemblance to Sallie Mae=s 
privatization). 
 270 See Mark Overend, The Privatization of Sallie Mae, in SERVING TWO MASTERS, YET OUT 
OF CONTROL:  FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 170, 173 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2001) (describing 
many benefactors of Sallie Mae=s privatization). 
 271 WALLISON, STANTON & ELY, supra note 72, at 25.  
 272 See Lea, supra note 264, at 9 (AThe process and structure was a win-win for the 
government and the shareholders of Sallie Mae.@). 
 indeed, the company completed the privatization 
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almost four years ahead of the deadline imposed by Congress.273  
Michael Lea has outlined three lessons that can be learned from the 
privatization of Sallie Mae that are of note in the context of Fannie 
and Freddie:  (1) GSE privatization can be done; (2) privatization is 
moved along by motivated parties, most importantly GSE 
shareholders and management; and (3) the sky does not fall when 
government support is terminated.274
Only privatization will protect the federal government from the 
serious risks posed by the implied guarantee and it should not be 
dismissed merely because it has not yet gained traction in 
Washington.  Moving a privatization agenda forward, however, will 
likely take a significant scare in the conforming mortgage market.  
Such a scare would need to be complemented by an unusual alliance 
of libertarians, good government groups, and populist politicians who 
object that the burden of the implied guarantee has been unfairly 
placed upon their taxpaying constituents.
 
275
How did these eight hundred pound gorillas end up in the 
mortgage market?  Well, sometimes the government makes bad, 
shortsighted decisions.  In the case of Fannie and Freddie, the 
  It would also need to be 
complemented by a program to preserve some of the benefits that 
Fannie and Freddie provide to the stability of the secondary 
mortgage market and to the consumer protection regime in the 
primary mortgage market.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the 
Democratic Party, in particular, could move ahead with a proposal 
that failed to provide for significant consumer protection in that 
market. 
 
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
                                                                                                                  
 273 Id. at 1. 
 274 Id. at 9B10.  This is not to say that the Sallie Mae privatization was ideal; there were 
critiques of it.  See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Lender to Pay So Students Can Learn Loan 
Options, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A14 (reporting that Sallie Mae entered into settlement 
with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo requiring Sallie Mae to adhere to new code of 
conduct). 
 275 See David Reiss, No Safety Net for Fannie and Freddie, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 9, 9 
(July 13, 2006) (AMoreover, principled commentators on the right and the left, including 
American Enterprise Institute scholars and Public Citizen=s Ralph Nader, agree that the 
implicit guarantee is no longer justified in today=s sophisticated mortgage market.  For the 
former, the guarantee amounts to the privatization of profits and the socialization of losses.  
For the latter, it is just another example of corporate welfare.  And indeed, in today=s world, it is 
both of those things.@). 
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government created off-budget entities to achieve a public good 
without putting pressure on the federal budget process.276
Such a crisis in the mortgage markets is no longer merely an 
unlikely doomsday scenario.  Two trends, the significant drop in 
housing pricesCthe first since the Great Depression
  But 
Fannie and Freddie, driven by the ever-present profit motive, were 
able to exploit their regulatory privileges to an extraordinary degree, 
and in ways predicted by no one.  They have also been able to duck 
and weave through their negative publicity over the years in order to 
maintain this regulatory privilege.  And they will continue to do so 
until there is a major financial crisis or until Congress focuses 
sufficiently on the massive risks that these entities pose to the 
federal budget and the American taxpayer. 
277Cand the 
increase in interest rates, have already devastated the subprime 
mortgage market for both homeowners and investors.278  There are 
already signs that this contagion might spread to other parts of the 
mortgage market and to Fannie and Freddie themselves.279
It is obviously preferable to act before such a crisis arises.  As 
Professor Carnell warns, a crisis is Aa particularly inopportune time 
for attempting to reeducate market participants about the scope of 
the government=s undertakings.@
  While 
the two companies do not appear to be at risk right now, it is not too 
hard to imagine a scenario extrapolated from current subprime 
market trends that would set off a crisis throughout the rest of the 
mortgage markets. 
280
                                                                                                                  
 276 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.  See generally Part IV.A.1. 
 277 See Trista Winnie, First Drop in Housing Prices Since the Depression?, NUWIRE 
INVESTOR, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/articles/first-drop-in-housing-prices-
since-the-depression-51417.aspx (reporting on first annual drop in median existing home prices 
on record). 
 278 See Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, Subprime Loans Going from Boon to Housing Bane:  
Minority Buyers Especially Hurt As Interest Rates Adjust Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at 
C1 (reporting on effects of subprime mortgage crisis). 
 279 See Ip & Hilsenrath, supra note 1 (discussing tightening credit conditions); Hagerty, 
supra note 46 (AFalling prices on subprime mortgage bonds have cut the value of such securities 
held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by $4.7 billion . . . .@). 
  Fannie and Freddie appear to 
 280 Improving, supra note 73, at 16 (statement of Richard S. Carnell, Professor, Fordham 
University School of Law).  Notwithstanding the varied policy fixes proposed to remedy the 
implied guarantee, those who study, but are not affiliated with, Fannie and Freddie speak in 
one voice about the risks that the implied guarantee poses.  See, e.g., Frame & White, supra 
note 71, at 60 (AIn a perfect world, the American polity would realize that the social benefits of 
continuing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and also the FHLBs) as GSEs fall short of the social 
costs, and true privatization of those enterprises would readily follow.@); Jaffee, supra note 116, 
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have stabilized after getting a handle on their respective accounting 
crises.281  Thus, the time to address the risks that they pose is now, 
no matter the political challenges such a path presents.282
Such challenges are not, of course, new ones.  People have always 
sought to acquire regulatory privilege for themselves.  President 
Jackson accompanied his veto of the rechartering of the Second Bank 
of the United States, an antecedent to today=s GSEs,
 
283
Admit that the bank ought to be perpetual, and as a 
consequence the present stockholders will be established 
as a privileged order, clothed both with great political 
power and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from 
their connection with the government.
 with the 
following message: 
 
The powers, privileges and favors bestowed in the 
original charter operate as a gratuity to the stockholders. 
 If the government sell [sic] monopolies and exclusive 
privileges, then they should at least exact for them as 
much as they are worth in the open market. 
284
The fundamental issues facing the federal government remain the 
same today, as does the political dynamic.  Jackson stared down 





                                                                                                                  
at 16 (A[I]t is a [sic] fair to say that [Fannie and Freddie] rather fully protect their shareholders 
[sic] equity against the small and foreseeable risks, while imposing on US taxpayers the large 
and distant risks that would eventually require a US Treasury bailout.@). 
 281 See, e.g., Jody Shenn & James Tyson, 2 Mortgage Lenders Are Heroes After Subprime 
Fallout, INT=L HERALD TRIB., June 6, 2007, at 16 (reporting on financial comeback of Fannie and 
Freddie). 
 282 See KRIZ, supra note 106, at 4 (noting Moody=s report on GSEs throughout world that 
A[t]here is a global trend by governments to reduce their contingent liabilities and business 
activities@). 
 283 The Second Bank of the United States was federally chartered, had private shareholders, 
and financially benefited from a special relationship with the federal government.  See ARTHUR 
M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 74B102 (1945) (providing history of Second Bank of 
United States). 
 284 Alex J. Pollock, Open Forum:  End GSEs= Perpetual Charters, NAT=L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
Jan. 23, 2006, at 4 (quoting veto message of President Jackson). 
 285 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 283, at 88B102 (noting history of President Jackson=s veto 
of Second Bank). 
 
